## Facts

- A husband and wife sued a physician for malpractice arising from prenatal care and delivery.
- Plaintiffs alleged the physician negligently failed to take timely pelvic measurements during pregnancy.
- Plaintiffs contended timely measurements would have shown a Caesarean section was indicated and that attempting vaginal delivery caused the wife serious injury and the husband loss of services and consortium.
- The complaint alleged the physician was licensed, practiced in the District of Columbia, held himself out as well qualified in treating women’s disorders and diseases, and was relied upon by plaintiffs.
- At trial, plaintiffs sought to prove the physician held himself out specifically as a specialist in obstetrics, which would subject him to a higher standard of care than a general practitioner.
- The trial court excluded specialist-status evidence as outside the pleadings and denied plaintiffs leave to amend to add that allegation.
- After plaintiffs rested, the trial court directed a verdict for the physician.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by construing the complaint to bar proof that the physician held himself out as an obstetrics specialist and by refusing amendment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b).
2. Whether the directed verdict for the physician was improper where plaintiffs were prevented from presenting a specialist-based theory of liability.

## Decision

- The court of appeals reversed and remanded.
- The trial court erred in excluding evidence of specialist status and in refusing to permit amendment to conform the pleadings to that theory.
- The rulings were prejudicial because they compelled plaintiffs to proceed under the general-practitioner standard rather than the stricter specialist standard shown by the record to be different.
- Because plaintiffs were denied a fair opportunity to present their full merits theory, the directed verdict based on the truncated presentation could not stand.

## Legal Principles

- Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), amendments to conform pleadings to the evidence should be freely allowed when they serve adjudication on the merits and do not unfairly prejudice the opposing party.
- Technical or overly narrow pleading constructions should not bar a party from presenting a substantive theory where the opposing party has adequate notice and no substantial claim of unfair surprise.
- A physician who holds himself out as a specialist may be held to the standard of care and skill ordinarily exercised by reasonably careful specialists in that field, which can be more demanding than the standard for general practitioners.
- When procedural rulings prevent proof of a higher, applicable standard of care, resulting prejudice may require reversal, including where a directed verdict follows the curtailed presentation.

## Conclusion

The appellate court held that the trial court’s refusal to allow amendment and corresponding exclusion of specialist-status evidence improperly altered the operative standard of care in the malpractice case, prejudiced plaintiffs, and required reversal of the directed verdict and remand for further proceedings.


Robbins v. Jordan, 181 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1950)