## Facts

- A certified plaintiff class sued New York City and State officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful practices in processing applications for food stamps, Medicaid, and public assistance.
- Plaintiffs asserted multiple claims challenging defendants’ policies for handling and disposing of public-benefit applications.
- One claim was resolved against plaintiffs on summary judgment; the remaining claims were resolved by settlement.
- The City defendants denied liability but agreed in the settlement to implement specified changes in how benefits claims would be handled going forward.
- The district court dismissed the claims against the City defendants with prejudice and expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.
- Plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, asserting that the dismissal order and retained enforcement jurisdiction materially altered the parties’ legal relationship.
- The district court denied fees, concluding that the settlement lacked the judicial sanction required for prevailing-party status after Buckhannon.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs who obtain a dismissal with prejudice coupled with an order retaining federal jurisdiction to enforce a settlement are “prevailing parties” entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
2. Whether retention of jurisdiction supplies the “judicially sanctioned” change in the parties’ legal relationship required by Buckhannon for fee recovery.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit vacated the order denying attorney’s fees and remanded.
- The court held that the district court’s express retention of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement provided sufficient judicial approval to support prevailing-party status under § 1988.
- The court directed further proceedings to determine the appropriate amount of fees.

## Legal Principles

- Under Buckhannon, a fee applicant must show a judicially sanctioned material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties; a lawsuit’s catalytic effect alone is insufficient.
- A settlement may support prevailing-party status when a court order dismissing the action also retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, making compliance judicially enforceable.
- Retained enforcement jurisdiction can render a settlement functionally similar to a consent decree because it places the court’s authority behind the parties’ obligations.
- A purely private settlement—without judicial enforcement authority (such as retention of jurisdiction or comparable oversight)—generally does not confer prevailing-party status under § 1988.

## Conclusion

Because the dismissal order expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, the agreement was judicially enforceable and produced a material change in the parties’ legal relationship; plaintiffs therefore qualified as prevailing parties, and the fee denial was vacated and remanded for a fee determination.


Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2003)