Robert Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355 (1999)

Facts

  • In 1996, 17-year-old Robert Taylor was traveling in Knox County, Kentucky with his girlfriend, Lucy Cotton, and Cotton’s infant son in a 1985 Buick.
  • The group had multiple firearms with them, including a rifle and a handgun.
  • The Buick stalled, and Taylor sought help from a nearby resident, Herman McCreary.
  • McCreary came to assist in his 1984 Ford pickup truck and attempted to jump-start the Buick, but his efforts failed.
  • Taylor decided to take McCreary’s truck.
  • Taylor retrieved a rifle, pointed it at McCreary, ordered him to the ground, and struck McCreary in the head with the rifle stock, knocking him unconscious.
  • When McCreary regained consciousness, Taylor threatened to “blow his head off” unless McCreary got into the ditch beside the road; McCreary complied.
  • Taylor, Cotton, and the infant drove away in McCreary’s pickup truck.
  • McCreary contacted the police, and Taylor and Cotton were later apprehended.
  • Taylor was tried in Knox Circuit Court (in a joint trial with Cotton) and was convicted of second-degree assault, first-degree robbery, and possession of a handgun by a minor; the court imposed consecutive sentences.

Issues

  1. Did convicting Taylor of both first-degree robbery and second-degree assault for the same criminal episode violate the Double Jeopardy Clause (and Kentucky’s parallel protection) under the Blockburger same-elements test?
  2. Did the trial court err in refusing to sever Taylor’s trial from co-defendant Cotton’s trial?
  3. Did the trial court commit reversible error in instructing the jury on the charged offenses and related options?
  4. Was the evidence sufficient to support Taylor’s conviction for possession of a handgun by a minor?

Decision

  • The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Taylor’s convictions and consecutive sentences.
  • The court held there was no double-jeopardy violation because first-degree robbery and second-degree assault each contain an element the other does not, satisfying Blockburger.
  • The court held the denial of severance was not an abuse of discretion because Taylor did not show the type of prejudice that would prevent a fair trial in a joint proceeding.
  • The court held the jury instructions did not warrant reversal when considered as a whole.
  • The court held the evidence permitted a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor, a minor, possessed a handgun within the meaning of the statute.
  • Under Blockburger v. United States, multiple convictions do not violate double jeopardy if each offense requires proof of at least one statutory element that the other offense does not.
  • First-degree robbery (KRS 515.020) requires proof that, in the course of committing a theft, the defendant used or threatened immediate physical force and had an aggravating factor such as being armed with a deadly weapon; robbery does not require proof of actual physical injury.
  • Second-degree assault (KRS 508.020) requires proof of intentional physical injury caused by a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; assault does not require proof of a theft element.
  • Severance of co-defendants is committed to the trial court’s discretion and is required only when a joint trial creates prejudice so serious that it denies a fair trial.
  • In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a reasonable juror could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt; possession may be shown by proof of dominion or control rather than direct proof of the item in hand at the moment of arrest.

Conclusion

The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld Taylor’s convictions arising from the armed taking of McCreary’s pickup truck, ruling that first-degree robbery and second-degree assault were separate offenses under Blockburger because robbery required a theft-related element and assault required physical injury, and further finding no reversible error in trying Taylor jointly with Cotton, in the jury instructions given, or in the evidence supporting the handgun-by-a-minor conviction.