Robert Trent Jones II, Inc., and Robert Trent Jones Licensing Group, LLC v. GFSI, Inc. d/b/a Gear for Sports, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (2008)

Facts

  • Robert Trent Jones II, Inc. and Robert Trent Jones Licensing Group, LLC (collectively, Jones) owned and licensed trademarks associated with golf-course architect Robert Trent Jones, Jr.
  • GFSI, Inc., doing business as Gear for Sports, Inc. (Gear), was an apparel company that manufactures and distributes clothing.
  • Jones and Gear entered into a written trademark licensing agreement authorizing Gear to produce and distribute apparel bearing Jones’s trademarks.
  • The agreement restricted Gear from selling licensed products to “discount stores,” but the agreement did not define “discount store.”
  • Gear sold Jones-branded apparel to The Golf Warehouse (Warehouse), a golf retailer.
  • Jones contended Warehouse was a prohibited “discount store” under the agreement and that Gear’s sales exceeded the license scope, constituting trademark infringement and related violations.
  • On the meaning of “discount store,” both sides offered competing definitions through testimony.
  • Gear presented testimony that it had been selling Jones-branded apparel to Warehouse from the start of the agreement and that Jones did not object during that period.
  • Jones presented testimony that Jones personnel knew there were some sales to Warehouse, but claimed Jones acted to stop sales once Jones learned the extent of those sales.
  • Jones filed suit in federal court and moved for a preliminary injunction to stop Gear’s sales of Jones-branded products to Warehouse while the case proceeded.

Issues

  1. Whether Jones showed a likelihood of success (or serious questions going to the merits) that Gear breached the license and infringed Jones’s trademarks by selling to Warehouse as a prohibited “discount store.”
  2. Whether Jones established irreparable harm warranting immediate injunctive relief, given the disputed meaning of “discount store” and evidence of Jones’s knowledge of sales to Warehouse.
  3. Whether the balance of hardships and the public interest favored a preliminary injunction limiting Gear’s distribution channel pending resolution on the merits.

Decision

  • The court denied Jones’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
  • The court found Jones had not made the required showing on likelihood of success (or serious questions with a sharply favorable balance of hardships) because the contract term “discount store” was undefined and the record contained conflicting evidence about whether Warehouse fit that category.
  • The court concluded the evidence that Gear had sold to Warehouse for a period without timely objection by Jones weakened Jones’s request for immediate equitable relief.
  • The court found Jones’s showing of imminent, irreparable injury was not sufficiently clear on the preliminary record.
  • The court determined the equitable factors, including the effect of an injunction on Gear’s business operations versus the disputed nature of Jones’s claimed harm, did not justify the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction.
  • A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy requiring a strong evidentiary showing under the applicable circuit test (including likelihood of success and irreparable harm, or serious questions with a sharply favorable hardships balance).
  • Where a licensing restriction is not defined in the contract and the parties offer competing interpretations supported by mixed evidence, a court may find the moving party has not shown a clear likelihood of success at the preliminary-injunction stage.
  • In disputes over whether conduct exceeds the scope of a trademark license, the court’s initial focus remains on whether the plaintiff can show, on the present record, a clear contractual violation supporting its infringement theory.
  • Evidence of a licensor’s knowledge of the challenged distribution and delay in objecting can weigh against a finding of irreparable harm and can affect the equitable balancing on preliminary relief.

Conclusion

The court denied Jones’s request to immediately bar Gear’s sales to The Golf Warehouse because the license’s “discount store” restriction was undefined, the parties offered conflicting evidence about whether Warehouse fell within that term, and Jones’s prior knowledge of at least some sales to Warehouse weakened its showing of likely success and irreparable harm necessary for preliminary injunctive relief.