## Facts

- Around 2:00 a.m. on January 4, 1998, police attempted to arrest Shawnta Robertson for marijuana possession in Covington, Kentucky.
- Robertson broke free and fled on foot toward the Clay Wade Bailey Bridge; an officer pursued and called for backup.
- Robertson ran onto the bridge’s pedestrian walkway after vaulting a concrete barrier separating the roadway from the walkway.
- Additional officers responded; Officer Michael Partin drove onto the bridge ahead of the chase and stopped.
- Robertson reversed direction and appeared to surrender; the pursuing officer began handcuffing him.
- During the arrest, Officer Partin attempted to reach the walkway by vaulting the barrier but fell through a gap between the barrier and walkway, plunged into the Ohio River, and died.
- The Commonwealth prosecuted Robertson for second-degree manslaughter, asserting his unlawful flight foreseeably caused the dangerous pursuit that resulted in Partin’s death.

## Issues

1. Whether Robertson’s unlawful flight was a legal (proximate) cause of Partin’s death when the immediate physical cause was Partin’s own voluntary act of vaulting the barrier.
2. Whether Partin’s volitional act constituted a superseding intervening cause that broke the causal chain.
3. Whether the evidence supported that Robertson “wantonly” caused the death under KRS 507.040(1).

## Decision

- The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Robertson’s second-degree manslaughter conviction.
- The court held Robertson’s unlawful flight was both a “but for” cause and a proximate cause of Partin’s death.
- The court concluded Partin’s pursuit maneuver was a foreseeable response to flight and did not supersede causation.
- The court found the evidence sufficient for a jury to determine Robertson acted wantonly by consciously disregarding the substantial risk that a pursuit could cause serious injury or death.
- Any imperfections in the jury instructions did not warrant reversal because they did not prejudice Robertson.

## Legal Principles

- Proximate cause in criminal cases may be satisfied where the defendant’s wrongdoing foreseeably induces a dangerous response, even if the fatal injury is immediately produced by another person’s voluntary act.
- A victim’s or third party’s volitional act is not a superseding cause if it is a natural and foreseeable reaction to the defendant’s conduct.
- For second-degree manslaughter under KRS 507.040(1), “wantonness” may be established by proof the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk created by the defendant’s conduct, including risks associated with police pursuit.
- Causation may be inferred where, absent the defendant’s flight, the chain of events placing officers in the position to undertake risky pursuit actions would not have occurred.

## Conclusion

The court held that a suspect’s unlawful flight can support second-degree manslaughter when an officer is killed during a foreseeable, high-risk pursuit response, and the officer’s voluntary pursuit maneuver does not automatically sever proximate causation.


Robertson v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 832 (Ky. 2002)