## Facts

- Raymond Robson, Sr. (Ray Sr.) owned 50% of the outstanding shares of P.B. Services, Inc., and his son, Raymond Robson, Jr. (Ray Jr.), owned the other 50%.
- In 1975, Ray Sr. and Ray Jr. executed a written agreement addressing (1) payments tied to Ray Sr.’s retirement and (2) the disposition of their stock upon death.
- The agreement provided that Ray Sr. would receive $1,000 per month from the company for the remainder of his life.
- The agreement further provided that, upon Ray Sr.’s death, Ray Jr. would pay Ray Sr.’s widow $500 per month for the remainder of her life.
- The agreement also provided that, upon Ray Jr.’s death, Ray Sr. would pay Ray Jr.’s wife, Birthe Robson (Birthe), $500 per month for five years following Ray Jr.’s death or until Birthe remarried, whichever occurred first.
- In 1977, Ray Jr. and Birthe separated, and Ray Jr. filed a petition for divorce.
- On February 21, 1979, Ray Sr. and Ray Jr. modified their 1975 agreement by deleting the provision calling for payments to Birthe; Ray Jr. lined through the relevant language, and both Ray Sr. and Ray Jr. initialed the change in the presence of witnesses.
- Ray Jr. died two days later, on February 23, 1979, from cancer.
- Birthe sued Ray Sr. in federal court, seeking enforcement of the original 1975 provision requiring $500 monthly payments to her for five years.
- Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the material facts were treated as undisputed for purposes of the motions.

## Issues

1. Whether Birthe was a creditor beneficiary or a donee beneficiary of the 1975 agreement between Ray Sr. and Ray Jr.
2. Whether a donee third-party beneficiary’s rights vested at contract formation or only upon the occurrence of the triggering event (or detrimental reliance).
3. Whether Ray Sr. and Ray Jr. could validly modify the contract to eliminate Birthe’s payment provision before Ray Jr.’s death, thereby barring Birthe’s claim.

## Decision

- The court classified Birthe as a third-party donee beneficiary because the payment provision to her did not satisfy any preexisting legal duty owed to her; it functioned as a gratuitous benefit created by the contract.
- The court held that, under the applicable third-party beneficiary rules, a donee beneficiary’s rights do not become fixed at contract formation in the same way a creditor beneficiary’s rights may.
- The court determined that Birthe’s rights had not vested before the February 21, 1979 modification because the contract’s payment obligation to her was contingent on Ray Jr.’s death and there was no showing that Birthe detrimentally relied on the promised payments.
- Because the contracting parties modified the agreement before the contingency occurred and before any vesting through reliance, the deletion of Birthe’s benefit was effective.
- The court denied Birthe’s motion for summary judgment and granted Ray Sr.’s motion for summary judgment, entering judgment for Ray Sr.

## Legal Principles

- A third party may enforce a contract only if the contracting parties intended to confer an enforceable benefit on that third party.
- Third-party beneficiaries are commonly categorized as creditor beneficiaries (performance satisfies an existing obligation) or donee beneficiaries (performance is intended as a gift-like benefit).
- A donee beneficiary’s ability to enforce depends on whether the beneficiary’s rights have vested; vesting may occur upon the happening of a stated condition or through detrimental reliance.
- Before a donee beneficiary’s rights vest, the original contracting parties generally may modify or revoke the promised benefit, including by deleting the third-party payment provision.
- In the absence of evidence that the beneficiary changed position in reliance on the promised benefit, a pre-condition modification that removes the benefit will bar enforcement by the third party.

## Conclusion

In *Robson v. Robson*, the court treated Birthe as a donee third-party beneficiary and held that her rights to receive payments had not vested before Ray Sr. and Ray Jr. removed the payment provision; because the modification occurred before the triggering event (Ray Jr.’s death) and Birthe showed no detrimental reliance, the court enforced the modification and entered summary judgment for Ray Sr.


Robson v. Robson, 514 F.Supp. 99 (1981)