Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)

Facts

  • Texas criminal statutes prohibited procuring or attempting an abortion except when necessary to save the pregnant woman’s life.
  • “Jane Roe,” an unmarried pregnant woman, sought to terminate her pregnancy through a physician but could not lawfully do so in Texas and lacked funds to travel elsewhere.
  • Roe filed a federal class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Dallas County district attorney responsible for enforcement.
  • A physician with pending state prosecutions intervened; a married couple not then pregnant also challenged the statutes based on possible future pregnancy.
  • A three-judge federal district court declared the statutes unconstitutional but denied an injunction; it dismissed the married couple’s claims as nonjusticiable.
  • The parties pursued direct Supreme Court review.

Issues

  1. Whether the controversy was moot because Roe’s pregnancy ended before final review.
  2. Whether Roe and the other plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Texas statutes.
  3. Whether criminalizing abortion except to save the mother’s life violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause by infringing a protected privacy/liberty interest.
  4. Whether the unborn are “persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Decision

  • The Court held Roe’s claim was justiciable and not moot because pregnancy is capable of repetition yet evading review.

  • The Court held Roe had standing; the physician-intervenor and the nonpregnant married couple did not.

  • The Court held the Due Process Clause protects a liberty interest broad enough to include a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy, subject to regulation tied to legitimate state interests.

  • The Court held the unborn are not “persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

  • The Court adopted a trimester-based framework:

    • First trimester: the decision is left to the pregnant woman and her physician; the state may not substantially interfere.
    • Second trimester: the state may regulate abortion procedures in ways reasonably related to maternal health.
    • After viability: the state may regulate or prohibit abortion, except where necessary in appropriate medical judgment to preserve the life or health of the mother.
  • The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment.

  • The Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “liberty” includes decisional privacy concerning whether to continue a pregnancy.
  • The abortion right is not absolute; it must be balanced against state interests in maternal health and in potential life.
  • The strength of the state’s regulatory interests increases over the course of pregnancy and becomes compelling at defined points (maternal health after the first trimester; potential life at viability).
  • A statute broadly prohibiting abortion at all stages, with only a life-saving exception, is unconstitutional for failing to account for these varying interests.
  • The Fourteenth Amendment’s use of “person” does not include the unborn.

Conclusion

The Court invalidated Texas’s near-total abortion ban, recognized abortion decisionmaking as protected by Fourteenth Amendment liberty, and set a trimester framework allowing increasing regulation as pregnancy progresses, including post-viability prohibitions with exceptions for the pregnant woman’s life or health.