## Facts

- A state prisoner filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging prison medical staff were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
- A magistrate judge advised the prisoner he could elect to have the magistrate judge, rather than an Article III district judge, preside over the entire case; the prisoner consented orally and in writing.
- The district judge issued a conditional referral to the magistrate judge for final disposition, stating the order would be vacated if any defendant did not consent.
- One defendant filed a written consent; two defendants filed no written consent but proceeded without objecting.
- The case was tried to a jury before the magistrate judge; the jury returned a verdict for the defendants and judgment was entered.
- On appeal, the court of appeals raised the magistrate judge’s authority sua sponte and ordered inquiry into whether all parties had consented.
- After judgment, the two non-signing defendants submitted written letters stating they consented to the prior proceedings before the magistrate judge.
- The magistrate judge found the defendants’ conduct showed implied consent but concluded that controlling circuit precedent required express consent and therefore treated the earlier proceedings as unauthorized; the district court and court of appeals agreed.

## Issues

1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) permits consent to a full-time magistrate judge’s civil trial jurisdiction to be inferred from a party’s informed, voluntary participation, or instead requires express consent.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
- The Court held that, for full-time magistrate judges under § 636(c)(1), consent may be inferred from a party’s litigation conduct.
- The defendants’ general appearances and participation before the magistrate judge, after notice of the right to an Article III judge, supplied the required consent.
- The Court rejected the view that the absence of express consent is a nonwaivable jurisdictional defect in these circumstances.

## Legal Principles

- Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), a full-time magistrate judge may conduct all proceedings and enter judgment when the parties have voluntarily consented; the statute does not require consent in a particular form.
- Consent may be implied where the party is aware of the need to consent and the right to refuse, yet voluntarily proceeds before the magistrate judge through trial without objection.
- Implied consent must rest on informed and voluntary participation, not mere silence in ignorance.
- Treating formal-consent defects as automatically fatal after an adverse outcome risks strategic withholding of objections and unnecessary retrials.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 636(c)(1) allows a party’s consent to a full-time magistrate judge’s civil jurisdiction to be inferred from informed, voluntary conduct during litigation, and it reinstated the magistrate judge’s authority to enter judgment based on such implied consent.


Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003)