## Facts

- William Sheffield agreed in Switzerland to buy a St. Bernard dog from a monastery (Hospice du Grand St. Bernard) operated by the Canons Regular of St. Augustine, dealing with Fr. Bernard Cretton.
- The price was $175 payable in installments; shipment to Sheffield in California was to occur after the first payment, with freight to be paid by Sheffield.
- Sheffield paid $60 but did not receive the dog; the monastery demanded full payment plus additional charges and refused to refund the $60.
- Sheffield first sued various church-related defendants, including the Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco (a corporation sole); the Archbishop was dismissed on demurrer.
- Sheffield then filed an essentially identical complaint in superior court, alleging “unity of interest and ownership” among the defendants and seeking to treat the Archbishop and other entities as alter egos.
- The Archbishop moved for summary judgment, asserting he was not a contracting party and that no facts supported alter-ego or agency liability; the trial court denied the motion.
- The Archbishop petitioned for extraordinary relief seeking an order compelling entry of summary judgment in his favor.

## Issues

1. Whether Sheffield produced evidence creating a triable issue of material fact that the Archbishop could be held liable on an alter-ego or agency theory for an alleged contract breach by a Swiss monastic order.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment and, if so, whether mandamus relief was proper to compel entry of judgment.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal granted a peremptory writ of mandate.
- The court directed the superior court to vacate its order denying summary judgment and to enter summary judgment for the Archbishop.
- The court held there was no triable issue of material fact supporting alter-ego or agency liability against the Archbishop.

## Legal Principles

- Alter-ego liability requires (1) unity of interest and ownership such that separate personalities do not exist and (2) an inequitable result if separateness is respected; conclusory allegations are insufficient.
- Summary judgment is proper where the moving party shows the absence of a triable issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and the opponent fails to produce admissible evidence raising a triable issue.
- Religious hierarchy and canon-law governance, without specific civil-law facts showing domination, commingling, or control of the transaction, do not establish alter-ego or agency liability among separate legal entities.
- A diocesan corporation sole is treated as a distinct civil legal person; absent evidence connecting it to the contract or the alleged wrong, it is not liable for acts of separate foreign religious orders.

## Conclusion

The court ordered summary judgment for the Archbishop because Sheffield’s alter-ego and agency theories relied on church structure and conclusory assertions rather than evidence showing the Archbishop’s control over the Swiss monastery or any contractual nexus to the dog-purchase transaction.


Roman Cath. Archbishop of S.F. v. Sheffield, 93 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)