## Facts

- James Scanlon was found dead in a bar he operated in Allentown, Pennsylvania; he had been repeatedly stabbed and his body set on fire.
- Ronald Rompilla was indicted for murder and related offenses, and the Commonwealth sought the death penalty.
- A jury convicted Rompilla at the guilt phase.
- At the penalty phase, the prosecution pursued aggravators including murder during another felony, murder by torture, and a significant history of violent felony convictions.
- The Commonwealth relied on Rompilla’s prior rape-and-assault conviction as aggravating evidence.
- Defense mitigation presentation was limited, consisting largely of brief family pleas for mercy and testimony from Rompilla’s 14-year-old son.
- The jury found some mitigating circumstances but concluded aggravation outweighed mitigation and sentenced Rompilla to death.
- On state postconviction review, Rompilla argued ineffective assistance at sentencing for failure to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence about his childhood, mental functioning and health, and alcoholism; state courts denied relief.
- In federal habeas proceedings, the district court granted relief; the Third Circuit reversed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

## Issues

1. Whether penalty-phase counsel in a capital case performs deficiently under the Sixth Amendment by failing to obtain and review the file for a prior conviction the prosecution is expected to use as aggravating evidence.
2. Whether, under *Strickland v. Washington*, the failure to review the prior-conviction file prejudiced the sentencing outcome.
3. Whether the state court’s rejection of the ineffective-assistance claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit.
- The Court held that counsel’s failure to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review the prior-conviction file that the prosecution planned to use in aggravation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
- The Court held Rompilla established prejudice because the unpresented mitigating evidence created a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have weighed the sentencing factors differently.
- The Court concluded the state court’s contrary determination unreasonably applied *Strickland* under AEDPA.
- The death sentence was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Under *Strickland*, counsel must perform reasonably and prejudice is shown by a reasonable probability of a different result absent counsel’s errors.
- In capital sentencing, reasonable investigation includes pursuing readily available, clearly relevant sources of mitigation, including records tied to aggravating evidence the prosecution is expected to offer.
- Counsel’s investigative duty may persist even when the defendant and family suggest no mitigation exists or provide little assistance.
- For federal habeas relief, a petitioner must show the state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
- Prejudice in the capital-penalty context asks whether there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance between aggravation and mitigation.

## Conclusion

The Court held that capital counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to review an accessible prior-conviction file the prosecution intended to use in aggravation, because the file contained substantial mitigating evidence and its omission created a reasonable probability of a different sentencing outcome.


Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005)