## Facts

- Rong Yao Zhou and Xiu Juan Wu, District of Columbia residents, were struck and seriously injured by a car on Connecticut Avenue in Chevy Chase, Maryland.
- The driver, Peter Joray, had been drinking at the Brittany Restaurant in Washington, D.C., operated by Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc.
- The complaint alleged restaurant employees served alcohol to Joray after he became intoxicated and after his intoxication was apparent.
- After leaving the restaurant, Joray drove into Maryland and soon thereafter struck the plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs alleged the restaurant’s service violated D.C. Code § 25-121(b) (1981), which prohibited selling alcoholic beverages to a person who is, or appears to be, intoxicated.
- Plaintiffs sued the restaurant in D.C. Superior Court for damages; the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendant, and plaintiffs appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether District of Columbia or Maryland law governed claims arising from alcohol service in D.C. followed by an injury-producing collision in Maryland.
2. Whether plaintiffs stated a tort claim under D.C. law by alleging the restaurant violated D.C. Code § 25-121(b) by serving an apparently intoxicated patron and that the violation proximately caused plaintiffs’ injuries.

## Decision

- The court held District of Columbia law governed under D.C.’s interest-analysis approach.
- The court held the complaint stated a claim: violating D.C. Code § 25-121(b) could constitute negligence per se, supporting liability to third parties injured by the intoxicated patron if proximate causation is proven.
- The court ruled proximate cause was not resolved as a matter of law on the pleadings; it was for the factfinder on the alleged facts.
- The court vacated the judgment on the pleadings and remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Under D.C. choice-of-law “interest analysis,” the governing law is that of the jurisdiction with the more substantial interest in resolving the issue, including regulation of conduct occurring within its borders.
- In the District of Columbia, violation of a public-safety statute may constitute negligence per se when (i) the plaintiff is within the class protected, (ii) the harm is of the type the statute seeks to prevent, and (iii) the violation proximately caused the injury.
- D.C. Code § 25-121(b)’s prohibition on serving persons who are, or appear to be, intoxicated is a public-safety measure intended to protect the public from dangers associated with intoxication, including driving-related injuries.
- Allegations that unlawful alcohol service to an apparently intoxicated patron led to off-premises injuries can support third-party liability; proximate cause typically presents a fact question not suitable for disposition on the pleadings.

## Conclusion

The court applied District of Columbia law and recognized that a restaurant’s unlawful service of alcohol to an apparently intoxicated patron, in violation of D.C. Code § 25-121(b), can constitute negligence per se supporting a third-party tort claim when the violation is alleged to be a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries, requiring reversal of a pleadings-stage dismissal.


Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Rest., Inc., 534 A.2d 1268 (D.C. 1987)