## Facts

- George Finbar Ross, a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, founded International Investment Limited, an offshore investment firm organized in Gibraltar and operated from Dublin.
- The firm solicited millions of dollars from investors (primarily in Northern Ireland) by promising high, tax-free returns.
- Authorities alleged the firm did not invest as represented; instead, it used investor funds to make unsecured loans to Ross and related entities, and Ross used funds for personal expenditures.
- Auditing and regulatory review efforts were hindered by limited access to records and poor bookkeeping; Gibraltar regulators also struggled to obtain required audited accounts.
- Northern Ireland issued arrest warrants charging Ross with forty-one offenses connected to the alleged fraud scheme.
- The United States arrested Ross under the U.S.–U.K. extradition treaty (as amended), and a magistrate judge certified him as extraditable.
- Ross sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing (among other points) that extradition was barred by lapse of time because he was not “fleeing from justice” for purposes of tolling under 18 U.S.C. § 3290.

## Issues

1. Whether extradition was barred by a statute-of-limitations theory, or whether any applicable limitations period was tolled under 18 U.S.C. § 3290 because Ross was “fleeing from justice.”
2. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding Ross was “fleeing from justice” for purposes of § 3290 in the extradition-habeas context.

## Decision

- The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ross’s habeas petition and left in place the magistrate judge’s certification of extraditability.
- The court held that the statute of limitations did not bar extradition because § 3290 tolled limitations while Ross was “fleeing from justice.”
- The court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding that Ross’s conduct satisfied the “fleeing from justice” standard.

## Legal Principles

- Habeas review of an extradition certification is limited to whether: (1) the magistrate had jurisdiction, (2) the charged offenses fall within the treaty, (3) there is evidence supporting probable cause, and (4) no clear legal bar prevents extradition.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 3290, “no statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice”; if the fugitive status is established, limitations are tolled.
- In this context, interpretation of § 3290 is reviewed de novo, while the factual finding that a person was “fleeing from justice” is reviewed for clear error.
- When tolling applies under § 3290, a limitations-based objection does not supply the type of clear legal bar needed to overturn extradition certification on habeas.

## Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit held that Ross’s extradition could proceed because the district court permissibly found he was “fleeing from justice,” which tolled any otherwise applicable limitations period under 18 U.S.C. § 3290, leaving no limitations-based bar to extradition on habeas review.


Ross v. U.S. Marshal for the E. Dist. of Okla., 168 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999)