## Facts

- Atlas Van Lines operated a nationwide interstate household-goods moving service through independent local moving companies acting as Atlas agents under standard agency contracts.
- The agency contracts required agents, when shipping under Atlas authority, to follow Atlas operating standards and use uniform rates; contracts commonly restricted agents from affiliating with competing van lines.
- Some agents obtained their own interstate operating authority (“carrier agents”), allowing them to haul shipments independently and compete with Atlas while also serving as Atlas agents.
- Atlas concluded that certain carrier agents were using Atlas-related resources (e.g., equipment, training, goodwill) to perform independent interstate carriage without compensating Atlas, creating a free-rider problem within the van line system.
- Following industry deregulation and increased competitive pressures, Atlas adopted a policy requiring carrier agents to separate Atlas-related operations from their independent operations and threatened termination for noncompliance.
- Several current and former Atlas agents sued, alleging Atlas and certain agents jointly implemented an unlawful concerted refusal to deal (“group boycott”) in violation of Sherman Act § 1.

## Issues

1. Whether Atlas’s policy restricting carrier agents’ independent operations constituted a per se unlawful “group boycott” under Sherman Act § 1.
2. Whether the restraint should be treated as an ancillary, primarily vertical restriction within a cooperative distribution system and analyzed under the rule of reason.
3. Whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence of market power and anticompetitive effects (reduced output, higher prices, or substantial foreclosure) in a properly defined relevant market to survive summary judgment.

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Atlas.
- The court held the policy was not a per se unlawful group boycott.
- The court treated the restriction as ancillary to the Atlas van line system and aimed at improving efficiency by limiting free riding and protecting the integrity of Atlas’s service offering.
- Under the rule of reason, plaintiffs failed to show anticompetitive effects in a relevant market, particularly given Atlas’s modest market share (about 6% of the national interstate household-goods moving market).
- The record did not support a finding that the policy decreased output or raised prices; it primarily regulated the internal allocation and use of Atlas assets and brand within the agency system.

## Legal Principles

- Per se condemnation for “group boycotts” is limited and generally inappropriate where the challenged conduct is part of a cooperative distribution arrangement and lacks strong indicia of naked horizontal exclusion.
- Restrictions that are ancillary to a legitimate joint venture or integrated distribution system, and plausibly tied to efficiency (including prevention of free riding), are ordinarily evaluated under the rule of reason.
- Rule-of-reason liability requires evidence of anticompetitive effects in a properly defined market; market power is a key consideration, and a small market share weighs strongly against an inference of output restriction or price elevation.
- A supplier’s limits on agents’ ability to use the supplier’s resources while simultaneously competing with the supplier do not, without more, constitute exclusion from the market when agents retain alternative channels to compete using their own authority.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit upheld Atlas’s agent-separation policy as an efficiency-motivated, ancillary restraint within a van line agency system, rejected per se “group boycott” treatment, and found plaintiffs’ rule-of-reason showing insufficient to establish market power or anticompetitive effects.


Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986)