## Facts

- The Peregoys executed and delivered a quitclaim deed conveying Yuma County real property to Ben C. Rowe on April 12, 1978.
- Rowe did not record the deed until May 12, 1978.
- Between delivery and recordation, Arthur C. Schultz obtained a money judgment against Michael Peregoy.
- Schultz recorded an abstract of judgment on April 28, 1978, and asserted it created a judgment lien on the parcel despite the earlier unrecorded conveyance to Rowe.
- It was undisputed that Rowe was a good-faith purchaser for value without notice of Schultz’s claim.
- Rowe sued to quiet title, contending Peregoy held no interest when Schultz recorded the abstract.

## Issues

1. Whether a judgment lien created by recording an abstract of judgment attaches to land the debtor previously conveyed by deed, when the conveyance was unrecorded at the time the abstract was recorded.
2. Whether the recording statute’s provision that unrecorded conveyances are “void as to creditors” gives a general judgment creditor priority over a prior good-faith grantee.

## Decision

- The court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment for Schultz.
- The court held Schultz’s judgment lien did not attach to the property because Peregoy had already conveyed it to Rowe before the lien arose.
- The court remanded with directions to enter judgment consistent with Rowe’s superior title.

## Legal Principles

- A judgment lien is purely statutory and attaches only to real property actually owned by the judgment debtor when the lien comes into existence.
- A judgment lien does not attach to property the debtor has previously conveyed by executed and delivered deed, even if the deed is unrecorded when the abstract of judgment is recorded.
- The “void as to creditors” language in the recording statute does not place a general judgment creditor in the position of a bona fide purchaser for value and does not allow the creditor to reach property already alienated by a prior conveyance.
- Recording acts primarily protect purchasers and value-giving encumbrancers who rely on the record, not judgment creditors whose liens arise by operation of law after the underlying transaction.

## Conclusion

Because the debtor had conveyed the property to a good-faith purchaser before the abstract of judgment was recorded, the judgment creditor’s lien could not attach; the recording statute did not expand the creditor’s rights to defeat the prior unrecorded deed.


Rowe v. Schultz, 642 P.2d 881 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)