Roy v. Euro-Holland Vastgoed, B.V., 404 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1981)

Facts

  • In 1910, Henry H. Buckman owned multiple tracts in Block 33 of the St. Lucie Inlet Farms subdivision.
  • In March 1913, Buckman conveyed a parcel described as the north 200 feet of the south 500 feet of Tract 1, Block 33, which had no access to a public road except by crossing Buckman’s remaining land.
  • Buckman retained surrounding land that abutted a public right-of-way; later conveyances placed that surrounding/access land in Euro-Holland Vastgoed, B.V.
  • Through multiple intervening conveyances, Maurice and Lillian Roy acquired the landlocked parcel.
  • The Roys had no practical ingress or egress to a public road except across Euro-Holland’s property.
  • The Roys sued for a common law way of necessity (implied easement by necessity), referencing § 704.01(1), Florida Statutes (1979).
  • After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for defendants, finding the Roys failed to prove (1) unity of title in a common source and (2) reasonable necessity.
  • The Roys appealed.

Issues

  1. Whether unity of title for a common law easement of necessity is satisfied by original common ownership at the time the landlocked parcel was created, even if the plaintiffs’ immediate grantor never owned the servient land.
  2. Whether a landlocked parcel with no access to a public road except over the neighboring tract satisfies the “reasonable necessity” element for an implied way of necessity.
  3. Whether an implied easement of necessity arising at severance runs with the land and benefits/burdens subsequent purchasers of the dominant and servient estates.

Decision

  • The appellate court reversed the final judgment for the defendants.
  • The court held unity of title existed because Buckman owned both the conveyed parcel and the retained access land at the 1913 severance that created the landlocked condition.
  • The court held the Roys proved reasonable necessity because their parcel lacked ingress and egress to a public way except over Euro-Holland’s property.
  • The court recognized a common law easement (way) of necessity benefiting the Roys’ parcel and burdening Euro-Holland’s land, despite intervening transfers.
  • The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with recognizing and implementing the easement.
  • A common law way of necessity may be implied when, upon severance of commonly owned property, one resulting parcel is left without access to a public road except over the other.
  • Unity of title is assessed at the time of the severance creating the necessity; it does not require that the dominant owner’s immediate predecessor also owned the servient tract.
  • The necessity element for an implied easement of necessity is “reasonable necessity” for beneficial use and enjoyment, satisfied where the parcel is effectively landlocked.
  • An easement of necessity implied at severance runs with the land, benefiting subsequent owners of the dominant estate and burdening subsequent owners of the servient estate.

Conclusion

The court reversed a judgment denying access and held that a way of necessity arose when a common owner conveyed a landlocked parcel while retaining the only route to a public road; because unity of title is determined at that severance and the necessity remained, the implied easement continued through later conveyances and bound subsequent owners.