## Facts

- Trummie Neal Rucker hid in a woman’s car while she went inside a post office.
- When the woman returned to her car and drove away, Rucker attacked her, punching her in the chest and face.
- Rucker forced the woman to drive to a gravel side road.
- He dragged her from the car, forced her down in the weeds, and raped her.
- During the assault, Rucker repeatedly hit the woman.
- After the rape ended, Rucker told the woman to run as fast as she could or he would shoot her; she ran away.
- The complainant was bruised and battered, with blackened and swollen eyes and contusions and scrapes over most of her body.
- The complainant suffered no broken bones, internal injuries, or permanent physical injuries.
- No gun or knife was used or displayed during the rape.
- Rucker was tried and convicted of aggravated rape under then-V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 21.03(a)(2), and the jury assessed life imprisonment.
- Rucker appealed, arguing the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the aggravating element alleged: that he threatened imminent death or serious bodily injury (or kidnapping) and that the threat compelled submission to intercourse.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient under V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 21.03(a)(2) to prove aggravated rape by showing, through Rucker’s words or conduct during the rape, a threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury that compelled the complainant’s submission.

## Decision

- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the aggravating element required by § 21.03(a)(2).
- The court reasoned that the only express verbal threat (“run or I’ll shoot”) occurred after the rape was completed and therefore did not compel submission to intercourse.
- The court further concluded that Rucker’s conduct (beating the complainant) showed force but, without a weapon and without serious bodily injury as required by existing case law, did not establish an implied threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury for purposes of aggravation.
- The aggravated-rape conviction was reversed for evidentiary insufficiency.
- Because the reversal was for insufficient evidence, double jeopardy barred retrial for aggravated rape; the court stated it was not holding that retrial for the lesser offense of rape was barred.

## Legal Principles

- Under § 21.03(a)(2), aggravated rape required proof that the defendant, by acts, words, or deeds, placed the complainant in fear that death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping would be imminently inflicted, and that this threat compelled submission to intercourse.
- A threat made only after intercourse is completed does not satisfy § 21.03(a)(2) because it does not compel submission to the rape.
- When no express verbal threat is made during the assault, the aggravating “threat” element may be proved by an implied threat communicated through the defendant’s conduct, but prior Texas decisions generally found this satisfied where a weapon was used or exhibited, serious bodily injury was actually inflicted, or both.
- Extensive bruising, swelling, contusions, and scrapes may establish force for rape, but do not necessarily constitute “serious bodily injury,” and may be insufficient—without more—to prove the aggravated element in § 21.03(a)(2).
- A reversal for legally insufficient evidence is the equivalent of an acquittal on that charge; under Burks v. United States and Greene v. Massey, the State may not retry the defendant for the same greater offense after such a reversal.

## Conclusion

Rucker’s aggravated-rape conviction was reversed because the State failed to prove the § 21.03(a)(2) aggravating element: the only explicit shooting threat was made after the rape ended, and the beating—though violent and causing visible bruising and swelling—occurred without a weapon and without serious bodily injury as required by then-existing precedent to show an implied threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury that compelled submission; double jeopardy therefore barred retrial for aggravated rape, while leaving open the possibility of proceedings on simple rape.


Rucker v. State, 599 S.W.2d 581 (1979)