## Facts

- In 1958, Marvin Rudow bought real property in Rockport, Massachusetts, taking title with his wife, Florence, as tenants by the entirety.
- In March 1962, Marvin quitclaimed his interest to Florence based on an alleged agreement that she would hold the property in trust for their minor son, William Rudow.
- In July 1962, Florence conveyed the property without consideration to her brother, Albert Fogel, who allegedly accepted title with knowledge of the asserted trust and agreed to hold on the same terms.
- Fogel later allegedly repudiated any trust obligation.
- Before William sued, Fogel brought an ejectment action against Marvin in District Court to obtain possession.
- In the ejectment action, Marvin asserted (i) the alleged trust and (ii) a right to possession based on curtesy as Florence’s surviving husband.
- The District Court found that a trust was not proved, but ruled Marvin was entitled to curtesy and thus could not be ejected; judgment entered for Marvin.
- In 1973, William (by Marvin) filed a Superior Court equity action seeking a declaration that Fogel held the property in trust for William.
- The Superior Court allowed Fogel’s summary judgment motion on res judicata grounds; the Appeals Court reversed; the Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review.

## Issues

1. Whether the prior ejectment judgment precluded William’s later action to enforce an alleged trust under res judicata or collateral estoppel.
2. Whether there was sufficient privity (legal identity) between Marvin in the ejectment action and William in the trust action to bind William to the earlier trust determination.
3. Whether the District Court’s finding that no trust was proved was essential to the ejectment judgment so as to have issue-preclusive effect.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court held that preclusion was not established and that summary judgment for Fogel was improper.
- The court ruled there was no sufficient legal identity between Marvin litigating for himself in the ejectment action and Marvin acting as William’s representative in the later trust action.
- The court further ruled that the District Court’s negative finding on the trust was not essential to the ejectment judgment, which rested on Marvin’s curtesy rights.
- The case was allowed to proceed on the merits of the alleged trust claim.

## Legal Principles

- Claim and issue preclusion generally require that the party to be bound was a party to the prior litigation or in privity (legal identity) with a party.
- A parent’s prior litigation of personal rights does not automatically bind a child asserting a distinct beneficial interest, even if the parent later appears as the child’s representative.
- Collateral estoppel applies only to issues actually litigated and determined that were essential to the prior judgment.
- A determination that is not necessary to the prior result (e.g., an alternative or superfluous finding) does not have preclusive effect.

## Conclusion

The court held that the prior ejectment judgment did not bar the minor’s subsequent action to enforce an alleged trust because the minor was not in privity with his father’s earlier personal litigation and the earlier “no trust” finding was unnecessary to the ejectment judgment, which turned on curtesy.


Rudow v. Fogel, 376 Mass. 587, 382 N.E.2d 1046 (1978)