## Facts

- Marathon entities and an affiliated Norwegian company participated in a North Sea gas venture and entered agreements to sell gas to European buyers, including Ruhrgas AG.
- The sales agreement included an arbitration clause providing for arbitration in Sweden.
- Marathon sued Ruhrgas in Texas state court asserting Texas-law tort claims, including fraud and interference with business relations.
- Ruhrgas removed to federal district court asserting multiple grounds for federal jurisdiction, including diversity (based on alleged fraudulent joinder), federal-question jurisdiction, and removal tied to an international arbitration agreement.
- Ruhrgas moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; Marathon moved to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- The district court addressed personal jurisdiction first and dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, without deciding subject-matter jurisdiction.
- The en banc Fifth Circuit vacated, holding that in removed cases a district court must decide subject-matter jurisdiction before personal jurisdiction.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether subject-matter jurisdiction must be determined before dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction in a removed case.

## Issues

1. Whether a federal district court handling a removed case must decide subject-matter jurisdiction before dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction.
2. Whether any mandatory “jurisdictional hierarchy” requires subject-matter jurisdiction to be addressed before personal jurisdiction when the court does not reach the merits.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded.
- The Court held that there is no rigid jurisdictional ordering requiring subject-matter jurisdiction to be decided before personal jurisdiction in removed cases.
- A district court may dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without first resolving contested subject-matter jurisdiction, particularly when the personal-jurisdiction inquiry is simpler and case-management considerations support that approach.
- The Court distinguished prohibitions on deciding the merits while assuming jurisdiction from the permissible choice between competing jurisdictional grounds for dismissal.

## Legal Principles

- Personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction are both threshold limits on a federal court’s power to adjudicate; resolving one does not constitute a merits determination.
- The rule barring “hypothetical jurisdiction” prohibits assuming jurisdiction to decide the merits, but does not impose a mandatory sequence among jurisdictional questions when the disposition is jurisdictional.
- Federal courts have discretion to select among non-merits, threshold grounds for dismissal when doing so conserves judicial resources and avoids unnecessary resolution of difficult jurisdictional questions.
- This sequencing discretion applies in removed cases; dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction does not improperly expand federal judicial power or displace state courts’ authority to adjudicate where jurisdiction exists.

## Conclusion

A federal district court may, in an appropriate removed case, dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without first deciding subject-matter jurisdiction, because no mandatory hierarchy compels subject-matter jurisdiction to be addressed first when the court does not reach the merits.


Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999)