Introduction
The rule established in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 concerns strict liability for damage caused by the escape of a dangerous substance accumulated on one’s land. This legal principle dictates that a person who, for their own purposes, brings onto their land and keeps there something likely to cause mischief if it escapes, must contain it at their peril. Failure to do so renders that person prima facie answerable for all the damage that is the natural consequence of its escape. This rule operates independently of fault, placing a burden on landowners to manage their activities in a manner that prevents harm to their neighbors. Key requirements include a non-natural use of land, the accumulation of a dangerous thing, and its subsequent escape causing damage. The principle, initially formulated in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, was later affirmed by the House of Lords, incorporating the additional requirement of non-natural land use.
Origin and Core Principles of Rylands v Fletcher
The case of Rylands v Fletcher arose from a dispute between two neighboring landowners. The defendant, Rylands, commissioned the construction of a reservoir on his property. During the project, independent contractors uncovered old, disused mine shafts on the land, but failed to adequately seal them. When Rylands filled the reservoir with water, it flowed into Fletcher’s neighboring coal mines causing significant damage. The court, in the Exchequer Chamber, decided that strict liability applied. Blackburn J stated: "…the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.” This establishes the foundational principle: an occupier who brings something hazardous onto their land is responsible for containing it and for the consequences of its escape. Lord Cairns LC, in the House of Lords, later added the requirement that this application only applies to a non-natural use of the land. This addition further restricted its scope to unusual or special uses of land that are not commonly undertaken.
Key Requirements of the Rule
To establish liability under Rylands v Fletcher, several conditions must be satisfied. First, the defendant must bring something onto their land. This excludes things naturally present, such as rocks or naturally occurring vegetation. The brought substance must also be considered “likely to do mischief if it escapes”. This term implies a reasonable anticipation of potential harm should the substance escape its confines, which is now further bound by the requirement that the damage caused is reasonably foreseeable. Furthermore, the use of the land upon which the dangerous substance is kept must be non-natural; that is, it is not the ordinary, regular, or usual use of the land. The concept of "non-natural use" was introduced by Lord Cairns in the House of Lords, refining the rule further. Finally, there must be an escape of the substance from the defendant's land into the claimant's property, resulting in damage. This "escape" does not necessarily entail a complete removal of the substance but implies its movement beyond the control of the defendant onto a different property. The case of Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board (1878) LR 4 Ex D 5 illustrates an "escape" through the branches of a yew tree extending onto the claimant's land, the tree itself not having moved, this was found to constitute an escape. Read v J Lyons & Co [1947] AC 156 clarifies that personal injury is not an actionable harm under this rule, and confirms that the harmful event must extend beyond one's own land.
Non-Natural Use of Land
The concept of "non-natural use of land" is central to the application of the Rylands v Fletcher rule. This requirement limits the scope of liability, preventing the rule from applying to ordinary domestic or agricultural uses of land. Lord Cairns, in Rylands v Fletcher, identified that if the water had accumulated naturally, then there would be no liability. A non-natural use is interpreted as a special use, something not common or ordinary in the location that increases the risk of harm to neighbors. The storage of large quantities of hazardous materials, such as chemicals, has often been deemed non-natural use, as seen in LMS International v Styrene Packaging and Insulation Ltd [2005] EWHC 2065. Similarly, constructing a reservoir like in the original Rylands v Fletcher case was deemed an unusual use of land at that time. In contrast, the court in Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2004] 2 AC 1, determined that the supply of water through a normal-sized pipe to a residential estate was not a non-natural use of land. This distinction highlights that the context and ordinary activities undertaken in a particular area, are factors used in determination of what qualifies as non-natural use. Lord Hoffmann, in Transco, proposed that the insurability of the relevant risk could be a useful guide in determining whether the use of the land was non-natural. If the risk is something that is typically covered by insurance, then this is likely to indicate a natural use of land.
Foreseeability and Limitations
While the Rylands v Fletcher rule imposes strict liability, it is not absolute. Over time, courts have introduced some limitations, notably the requirement of foreseeability of the type of damage. The House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264 clarified that damages under Rylands v Fletcher are only recoverable if the type of harm was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the escape. Lord Goff stated that “reasonable foreseeability of damage if an escape occurs is a prerequisite of damages”. Despite imposing a strict liability, foreseeability serves as an important limiting factor. This addition aligns the principle with similar torts like nuisance and negligence, where foreseeability also serves as a consideration. Furthermore, the escape must originate from the defendant’s land to a place outside their control or ownership, as established in Read v J Lyons & Co. The case of Perry v Kendricks [1956] 1 WLR 85 demonstrates that liability will not exist where the escape is caused by an act of a stranger unless the defendant could have reasonably anticipated and guarded against it. This limitation acknowledges that defendants should not be held liable for unforeseeable interventions by third parties which caused the escape.
Defenses and Exceptions
Various defenses and exceptions mitigate liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. These include the claimant's consent to the presence of the hazardous substance or a common benefit, where both the claimant and defendant benefit from the source of the danger. The "Act of God" defense, referring to events such as severe natural disasters beyond reasonable human foresight, also provides an exception. Furthermore, the act of a stranger causing the escape without the defendant’s culpability is also a valid defense, as was affirmed in Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263. If the claimant is at fault or has contributed through their negligence to the escape, that can also operate as a partial or complete defense. Finally, a statutory authority defense exists, where the activities were authorized or required by statute, and the defendant complies with the standards defined by the statute. These exceptions, defenses, and limitations illustrate that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is not an all encompassing principle of strict liability. Rather, it is a carefully crafted liability principle which holds the balance between protection from harm and the rights of an owner to use their property.
Conclusion
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher establishes a unique form of strict liability applicable to specific situations. This principle requires individuals who bring dangerous substances onto their land, and undertake non-natural use of it, to be strictly liable for any harm caused if that substance escapes their control. The key requirements, including the accumulation of a dangerous substance, non-natural use of land, and an escape causing foreseeable damage, define its scope. The added necessity of the foreseeability of damages from the Cambridge Water case, demonstrates a careful development of the law over time. The exceptions and defenses, such as consent, acts of strangers, and statutory authority, offer further boundaries to the rule’s reach. This liability rule, though developed in the 19th century, continues to be relevant in contemporary law, affecting various areas, including environmental and industrial regulations. Cases such as Transco have emphasized that this liability should not be extended too far from its intended purpose, especially into normal domestic and commercial activities. The rule operates as a sub-species of nuisance and has a limited scope of application, but forms an important part of the English legal framework. The current application of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher shows a cautious application which is appropriate for this strict liability regime.
