## Facts

- Louisiana drivers sued on behalf of a proposed class after personal information from Louisiana motor vehicle records (e.g., names and addresses) was obtained from the state DMV.
- Plaintiffs alleged Reed Elsevier Services, Inc. (doing business as LexisNexis) knowingly obtained DMV personal information for an impermissible purpose and redistributed it to customers, including plaintiffs’ counsel.
- Plaintiffs sought statutory remedies and damages under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq., asserting injury from the obtaining and disclosure of their information.
- Reed Elsevier moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (standing/ripeness) and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a DPPA claim.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs alleged an injury in fact fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct sufficient to establish Article III standing and ripeness for a DPPA claim.
2. Whether a DPPA claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) is adequately pled by alleging impermissible obtaining and disclosure of DMV data, or whether the complaint must allege impermissible use (and resulting harm) tied to a non-permitted purpose.

## Decision

- The court granted Reed Elsevier’s motion to dismiss.
- The court dismissed the DPPA claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs did not allege a concrete, non-speculative injury.
- Independently, the court held the complaint failed to state a DPPA claim because it did not allege actual impermissible use (or other facts showing the obtaining/disclosure occurred for a non-permitted purpose that caused injury).

## Legal Principles

- Article III standing and ripeness require a concrete injury to the plaintiff that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; a statutory cause of action does not eliminate that constitutional requirement.
- DPPA civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) attaches only when a defendant knowingly obtains, discloses, or uses personal information from motor vehicle records for a purpose not permitted by the DPPA.
- Allegations of mere possession, transfer, or resale of DMV data—without factual allegations of impermissible use or other concrete harm—are insufficient to establish jurisdiction and may be insufficient to state a DPPA claim.

## Conclusion

The court dismissed the DPPA claims because plaintiffs alleged only that their DMV information changed hands without pleading concrete harm or facts showing the defendant’s conduct was connected to an impermissible purpose or prohibited use sufficient to satisfy Article III and § 2724(a).


Russell v. ChoicePoint Servs., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D. La. 2004)