## Facts

- John Y. Rust, Jr. died leaving a will that gave his wife a $1,000 legacy and placed the residuary estate in trust for his minor daughter, Margene A. Rust.
- The will directed the executors/trustees to hold, manage, and control the residuary property for Margene’s benefit until October 17, 1967, when the trust would terminate and the property would vest in her in fee simple “free of any restrictions.”
- If Margene died before October 17, 1967 leaving issue, the issue would become trust beneficiaries and take the property in fee simple at termination.
- If Margene died before October 17, 1967 without issue, the property would pass in fee simple at her death to the testator’s then-living siblings, with descendants of deceased siblings taking per stirpes.
- The trustees received broad powers, including authority to mortgage, sell, convey, and reinvest trust property.
- The executors/trustees and other interested parties filed a suit to construe the will; the surviving wife challenged the residuary scheme as violating the Texas constitutional prohibition on perpetuities.
- The trial court upheld the will; the wife appealed individually and as guardian of the minor’s estate, while a guardian ad litem supported the will’s validity.

## Issues

1. Whether the residuary trust and alternative gifts to the daughter’s issue or the testator’s siblings violated the Texas Constitution’s prohibition against perpetuities by suspending vesting beyond the permitted period.
2. Whether the will created a present vested interest in the daughter at the testator’s death or a contingent interest dependent on her survival to the trust termination date.

## Decision

- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment upholding all will provisions.
- The court held the will did not violate the perpetuities prohibition.
- The court construed the daughter’s interest as vesting immediately at the testator’s death as a defeasible fee, subject to divestment if she died before October 17, 1967.
- The court treated the trust termination date as postponing possession and enjoyment, not vesting.
- The court held the substitutionary interests in the daughter’s issue or, failing issue, the testator’s siblings were valid because they would take effect, if at all, upon events tied to the daughter’s life and a fixed date.

## Legal Principles

- The perpetuities analysis turns on when an interest vests, not on when possession or enjoyment begins; postponing enjoyment through a trust does not alone create a perpetuity.
- A testamentary gift can vest immediately in a beneficiary as a defeasible fee, even if subject to divestment upon a condition occurring within the allowable period.
- Wills are construed, where reasonably possible, to favor early vesting and to avoid invalidity under perpetuities limits.
- Courts presume a testator intends a complete disposition of the estate; that presumption supports constructions avoiding partial intestacy when consistent with the will’s language.
- Future interests conditioned on a beneficiary’s death before a fixed date may be valid if the condition must occur, if at all, within a life in being and the permissible period.

## Conclusion

The court upheld the residuary trust, construing the daughter’s interest as a present vested defeasible fee upon the testator’s death and treating the trust term as delaying enjoyment rather than vesting; the alternative gifts to issue or siblings were valid substitutionary interests and did not violate the Texas constitutional prohibition against perpetuities.


Rust v. Rust, 211 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1948)