## Facts

- Moore Dry Dock Co. operated a ship repair and conversion yard in Oakland, California.
- Samsoc, a Panamanian shipowner, sent the S.S. *Phopho* to Moore for conversion into a gypsum carrier; Samsoc had no other U.S. place of business.
- Samsoc staffed the *Phopho* with a nonunion crew that boarded during the final conversion stage and worked and prepared the ship for departure.
- The Sailors’ Union sought recognition from Samsoc as bargaining representative for the *Phopho*’s crew; Samsoc refused.
- The union requested permission to picket on Moore’s premises adjacent to the vessel; Moore denied access.
- The union picketed at Moore’s shipyard gate and used signs and letters stating the dispute was with the *Phopho* and its owner, not with Moore.
- Moore’s employees ceased work on the *Phopho* within several days, and Moore filed an unfair-labor-practice charge alleging a secondary boycott under NLRA § 8(b)(4).

## Issues

1. Whether picketing at a neutral employer’s premises, where the primary employer is present only through a temporary “common situs” (a vessel), is lawful primary picketing or an unlawful secondary boycott under NLRA § 8(b)(4).
2. What conditions distinguish lawful common-situs primary picketing from coercive conduct directed at a neutral employer.

## Decision

- The NLRB dismissed the charge and held the union’s conduct was lawful primary picketing, not a prohibited secondary boycott.
- The Board found Samsoc was present at the situs through the *Phopho* and its crew, who were engaged in normal ship operations while at Moore’s yard.
- The Board treated gate picketing as sufficiently close to the primary situs because Moore denied access to picket nearer the vessel.
- The Board found the union’s signs and communications clearly identified the *Phopho* and its owner as the target and disclaimed any dispute with Moore.
- The Board concluded that neutral employees’ refusal to work was not dispositive when the union’s object and conduct were confined to lawful primary activity.
- Two members dissented, disputing the majority’s characterization of the picketing as purely primary.

## Legal Principles

- When a primary employer’s operations occur on a neutral employer’s premises, picketing there may be lawful if it is confined to the primary dispute rather than aimed at forcing the neutral to cease doing business with the primary.
- Common-situs picketing is presumed primary where:
  - Picketing is limited to times when the primary employer is present at the situs.
  - The primary employer is engaged in its normal operations at the situs.
  - Picketing occurs reasonably close to the primary situs.
  - The picketing clearly identifies the dispute as with the primary employer, not the neutral employer.
- A work stoppage by neutral employees may be an incidental effect of lawful primary picketing and does not alone establish an unlawful secondary objective.

## Conclusion

The Board held that picketing at a neutral shipyard directed at a vessel owner with no other U.S. situs was lawful primary activity when limited in time and place and when the union clearly identified the primary target, establishing the four-factor framework used to evaluate common-situs picketing under NLRA § 8(b)(4).


Sailors’ Union of the Pac. (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950)