## Facts

- Johnny Sample, a professional football player, and Gotham Football Club, Inc. (owner and operator of the New York Jets) executed three separate written agreements for Sample to play during the 1968, 1969, and 1970 NFL seasons.
- Each agreement was styled as a one-year “standard player’s contract” covering a different season; the dispute focused on the 1969 and 1970 documents.
- In a preseason exhibition game on August 1, 1969, Sample allegedly suffered an injury while performing services for the club.
- After the injury, the parties disputed Sample’s physical condition and whether he could resume normal player activities.
- The club released Sample during the 1969 season.
- Sample sued the club asserting, among other claims: (1) wrongful termination/breach of the 1969 contract, (2) entitlement to benefits under the 1970 contract, and (3) damage to his good name, reputation, and career allegedly resulting from the dismissal.
- The 1970 contract included an injury-benefit provision requiring the club to continue paying salary if Sample suffered an injury “during the term of this contract” that rendered him unable to perform obligations under “this contract.”
- Sample argued that, although the parties signed three separate one-year forms, he believed he was entering a single three-year agreement and claimed he was misled due to his lack of sophistication and lack of legal representation, combined with the club’s stronger bargaining position.
- The club responded that the parties entered three distinct one-year contracts and that the 1970 injury-benefit language applied only to injuries occurring during the 1970 term, not to an injury sustained in 1969.
- Procedurally, the club moved for summary judgment on the complaint, and Sample cross-moved for summary judgment on parts of his contract claims (and alternatively sought to strike an affirmative defense under Rule 12(f)).

## Issues

1. Whether summary judgment was proper on Sample’s claim that the club wrongfully terminated the 1969 contract, given disputed facts about the injury, Sample’s actions, and the contract’s injury/grievance procedure (including notice, medical certification, and return-to-play or grievance steps).
2. Whether Sample could enforce the 1970 contract’s injury-benefit provision for a 1969 injury by characterizing the three one-year documents as a single integrated multi-year agreement.
3. Whether summary judgment was proper on Sample’s reputational-harm claim arising from the dismissal.
4. Whether Sample was entitled to strike the club’s third affirmative defense under Rule 12(f).

## Decision

- The court denied both parties’ summary-judgment motions on the 1969 wrongful-termination/breach claim because genuine disputes of material fact existed, including disputes tied to the contract’s injury/grievance procedure and the parties’ conduct.
- The court rejected Sample’s attempt to obtain 1970 injury benefits for a 1969 injury, construing the 1970 injury-benefit clause as limited to injuries occurring “during the term” of the 1970 contract and declining to treat the separate one-year documents as a single contract for that purpose.
- The court declined to resolve the reputational-harm claim on summary judgment to the extent it depended on disputed facts about the alleged wrongful dismissal and resulting harm.
- The court denied Sample’s request to strike the club’s third affirmative defense under Rule 12(f).

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment must be denied when the record shows genuine disputes of material fact on elements such as breach, performance, and compliance with contract-based procedures.
- When parties execute separate writings that each cover a distinct contractual term, courts generally apply each writing according to its own text and term unless there is a legally sufficient basis to disregard that structure.
- Contract language limiting an injury benefit to injuries occurring “during the term of this contract” is construed according to its temporal limitation and is not extended to pre-term injuries.
- Claims of misunderstanding, unequal bargaining power, or lack of representation—without a showing that justifies setting aside or reforming the writings—do not permit a court to rewrite clear contract language.
- Motions to strike affirmative defenses under Rule 12(f) are generally disfavored and are denied where the defense is not plainly insufficient as a matter of law.

## Conclusion

Sample v. Gotham Football Club addressed cross-motions arising out of a player’s release following a 1969 injury and his effort to obtain later-season injury benefits. The court held that factual disputes required trial on the 1969 termination-related claim, but it enforced the 1970 contract’s injury-benefit clause as written and refused to apply it to an injury sustained in 1969, while also leaving fact-dependent aspects of the reputational claim and an affirmative defense for later development.


Sample v. Gotham Football Club, 59 F.R.D. 160 (1973)