Facts
- DeMont R.D. Conner, a Hawaii state prisoner, used angry and obscene language toward a correctional officer after a strip search.
- Conner received disciplinary charges for “high misconduct” (interference with a correctional function) and “low moderate misconduct” (abusive language and harassment).
- At a disciplinary hearing, an adjustment committee denied Conner’s request to call witnesses, citing witness unavailability and staffing constraints.
- The committee found Conner guilty and imposed 30 days’ disciplinary segregation in the Special Holding Unit; Conner served the term.
- Conner sought administrative review; months later a deputy administrator expunged the high-misconduct charge as unsupported.
- Conner filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a denial of procedural due process based on the refusal to permit witnesses.
Issues
- Whether Hawaii prison regulations or the Due Process Clause created a protected liberty interest in avoiding 30 days of disciplinary segregation.
- Whether the denial of requested witnesses at the disciplinary hearing violated due process if no such liberty interest existed.
- What standard governs when prison conditions or disciplinary sanctions trigger procedural protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court held that Conner’s 30 days of disciplinary segregation did not create a protected liberty interest because it did not impose an atypical and significant hardship compared to ordinary prison life.
- The Court rejected the approach that treated “mandatory language” in prison regulations as the primary basis for identifying state-created liberty interests.
- Because no protected liberty interest was implicated, the Constitution did not require the procedural protections Conner sought (including calling witnesses) for this sanction.
Legal Principles
- State-created liberty interests in prison generally arise only when a restraint imposes an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
- The liberty-interest inquiry focuses on the nature and effects of the restraint, not on whether prison regulations use mandatory phrasing.
- Routine, short-term disciplinary segregation that is comparable in duration and conditions to discretionary forms of confinement typically does not trigger due process protections.
- A liberty interest is more likely where a sanction inevitably affects the duration of confinement or otherwise departs sharply from expected conditions of a prison sentence.
Conclusion
The Court held that 30 days of disciplinary segregation under the conditions presented did not impose an atypical and significant hardship and therefore did not implicate a protected liberty interest; without such an interest, due process did not require witness presentation rights at Conner’s disciplinary hearing.