## Facts

- Stephanie Sandor worked for Safe Horizon, Inc. (Safe Horizon), a nonprofit organization, as a human-resources manager at a full-time salary of $47,578.
- Safe Horizon sought a temporary maternity-leave replacement for Abigail Saunders, its employee-relations manager for domestic-violence shelters, a role supporting approximately 700 employees.
- The job posting for the employee-relations manager role listed an undergraduate degree and three to five years of human-resources experience.
- Safe Horizon hired Richard Brown, a male, as the temporary replacement for Saunders.
- Brown was a high-school graduate who had completed certificate programs in not-for-profit management and had prior human-resources-related work history (including hotel HR and quality-assurance roles and work developing an HR department); he was unemployed when Safe Horizon hired him.
- Safe Horizon paid Brown $44,752 for 80% time (four days per week), which equated to a $55,940 full-time rate; Saunders had earned $44,752 for full-time work.
- Sandor later sought a senior director role; Safe Horizon selected Brown instead, and Sandor resigned.
- Sandor sued, alleging (1) race- and sex-based discriminatory failure to select her for advancement under Title VII, (2) race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (3) sex-based wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act (and related Title VII wage-discrimination theory), plus (4) a Title VII disparate-impact theory and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York common law.
- Safe Horizon moved for summary judgment; Sandor cross-moved for summary judgment and moved to strike portions of Safe Horizon’s submissions.

## Issues

1. Whether either party was entitled to summary judgment on Sandor’s Title VII and § 1981 claims arising from Safe Horizon’s decision to select Brown rather than Sandor for advancement.
2. Whether Sandor was entitled to summary judgment on liability for a willful Equal Pay Act violation based on a pay differential between Sandor and Brown for substantially equal work.
3. Whether Sandor’s Title VII disparate-impact claim could survive summary judgment without identifying a specific employment practice and supporting impact proof.
4. Whether Safe Horizon was entitled to summary judgment on Sandor’s New York claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on alleged workplace treatment.
5. Whether the court should strike portions of Safe Horizon’s summary-judgment evidence.

## Decision

- The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on Sandor’s Title VII and § 1981 advancement-related claims, finding genuine disputes of material fact.
- The court granted Sandor summary judgment on liability for a willful violation of the Equal Pay Act.
- The court granted Safe Horizon summary judgment on Sandor’s Title VII disparate-impact claim and dismissed it.
- The court granted Safe Horizon summary judgment on Sandor’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and dismissed it.
- The court denied Sandor’s motion to strike.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is improper where the record shows genuine disputes of material fact, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
- Equal Pay Act: A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that an employer paid different wages to employees of opposite sexes for substantially equal work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions; the burden then shifts to the employer to prove a statutory affirmative defense.
- Equal Pay Act defenses are limited to: a seniority system, a merit system, a system measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential based on a factor other than sex.
- Equal Pay Act willfulness: A violation is willful if the employer knew its conduct was prohibited or acted with reckless disregard as to whether the conduct was unlawful, affecting the limitations period and potential liquidated damages.
- Title VII disparate impact requires identification of a specific, facially neutral employment practice and a showing (often statistical) that the practice causes a significant adverse impact on a protected group.
- New York intentional infliction of emotional distress requires extreme and outrageous conduct and severe distress; ordinary workplace disputes, even when involving alleged discrimination, usually do not meet that standard.

## Conclusion

In *Sandor v. Safe Horizon, Inc.*, the court resolved cross-motions for summary judgment in a workplace-discrimination suit arising from Safe Horizon’s pay practices and advancement decision involving Sandor and a male comparator, Richard Brown. The court entered summary judgment for Sandor on liability for a willful Equal Pay Act violation based on the wage disparity for substantially equal work, dismissed Sandor’s disparate-impact and intentional-infliction claims, denied her motion to strike, and left the Title VII and § 1981 advancement-related claims for trial due to disputed facts.


Sandor v. Safe Horizon, Inc., 2011 WL 115295 (2011)