Facts
- Joseph Sandy placed his mare and colt in a neighbor’s pasture where other horses, including A. W. Bushey’s three-year-old colt, were also kept.
- On July 14, 1923, Sandy went to the pasture to feed (grain) his mare and was kicked by Bushey’s horse, suffering serious injuries.
- Evidence showed the horse had previously displayed a vicious disposition and that Bushey had notice of its vicious propensities.
- Sandy sued in tort seeking damages under a strict-liability theory for keeping a known vicious domestic animal.
Issues
- Under Maine law, is the keeper of a domestic animal strictly liable for injuries caused by the animal when the keeper knows of its vicious propensities?
- Does ordinary contributory negligence bar recovery in a strict-liability action for injuries inflicted by a known vicious domestic animal?
- What type of plaintiff conduct, if any, relieves the keeper of strict liability in such cases?
Decision
- The trial was submitted to a jury, which returned a verdict for Sandy.
- On Bushey’s general motion to set aside the verdict, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine overruled the motion.
- The court held that a keeper who knows a domestic animal is vicious is liable as an insurer for injuries caused by that animal, regardless of the keeper’s care.
- The court held that contributory negligence, in the ordinary sense, is not a defense to this strict-liability claim.
- The court concluded Sandy’s conduct in feeding his mare did not amount to knowingly and unnecessarily placing himself in the way of probable injury.
Legal Principles
- Keepers of domestic animals are not liable for injuries caused by animals in a place they have a right to be unless the animal is vicious and the keeper has knowledge of that condition.
- If a person keeps a vicious or dangerous domestic animal with knowledge of its harmful tendencies, liability is strict: the keeper is an insurer against injury, and due care in keeping the animal does not excuse liability.
- In a strict-liability action for a known vicious domestic animal, the plaintiff must prove keeping, the animal’s vicious propensities, and the keeper’s knowledge; negligence is not an element.
- Ordinary contributory negligence does not bar recovery because the cause of action does not rest on negligence.
- The keeper may be relieved only if the injury is attributable to the plaintiff’s unnecessary and voluntary exposure to a known danger—conduct amounting to knowingly placing oneself in the way of probable injury rather than harm caused by the animal’s known viciousness.
Conclusion
The court left the plaintiff’s verdict intact, holding that Maine imposes strict liability on keepers of domestic animals known to be vicious and that ordinary contributory negligence does not defeat recovery unless the plaintiff knowingly and unnecessarily exposed himself to the risk of injury.