## Facts

- Santa Clara Pueblo, a federally recognized tribe, enacted a membership ordinance denying membership to children of female members who married outside the tribe, while granting membership to children of male members who married outside the tribe.
- Julia Martinez, a Santa Clara member married to a Navajo man, alleged the ordinance excluded her children from tribal membership and related benefits, including participation in tribal political life and certain property and residency interests on tribal land.
- Martinez sued the Pueblo and its Governor in federal court under Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), relying on ICRA’s equal-protection provision, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).
- ICRA expressly provides a federal habeas remedy, 25 U.S.C. § 1303, to test the legality of tribal detention, but contains no express authorization for federal civil suits seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.
- The district court allowed the case to proceed but ruled for the Pueblo on the merits.
- The court of appeals found federal jurisdiction and an implied cause of action under ICRA, and held the ordinance violated ICRA’s equal-protection guarantee.
- The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether ICRA authorizes a federal civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief against a tribe or its officers.

## Issues

1. Whether tribal sovereign immunity bars a federal civil action under ICRA seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the tribe.
2. Whether ICRA § 1302 impliedly creates a private federal cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief against a tribal officer for prospective relief.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.
- The Court held tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit against the Pueblo because ICRA contains no clear statement subjecting tribes to federal jurisdiction in civil actions for declaratory or injunctive relief and the tribe had not waived immunity.
- The Court held ICRA does not impliedly authorize a private federal cause of action for declaratory or injunctive relief against tribal officers to enforce § 1302.
- Because the case was resolved on remedial and jurisdictional grounds, the Court did not reach whether the membership ordinance violated ICRA’s equal-protection provision.

## Legal Principles

- Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity from suit unless Congress clearly abrogates that immunity or the tribe clearly waives it.
- Title I of ICRA does not expressly authorize federal civil actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against tribes.
- The inclusion of a specific federal habeas remedy in 25 U.S.C. § 1303 weighs against implying broader federal remedies to enforce ICRA rights.
- Federal courts should not infer an uncodified cause of action under ICRA § 1302 against tribal officials where Congress structured ICRA to limit federal intrusion into tribal self-government.
- Absent explicit congressional authorization beyond habeas, ICRA rights are generally enforced through tribal institutions rather than federal civil litigation.

## Conclusion

The Court held that ICRA’s rights-creating provisions do not open federal courts to suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against a tribe or its officers, because tribal sovereign immunity remains intact without a clear congressional statement and ICRA provides no implied private federal civil cause of action beyond the statute’s express habeas remedy.


Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)