## Facts

- Leydiana Santiago was a patient of Dr. Marisa Baker and Women’s Care Florida, LLC, doing business as Lifetime Obstetrics and Gynecology (Lifetime).
- Santiago had a chronic medical condition treated with a prescription medication.
- When Santiago became a patient at Lifetime, she told the staff she and her husband were trying to have a child, and she stopped taking the medication while attempting to conceive.
- At the start of the patient-provider relationship, Santiago signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement that covered medical-malpractice claims.
- Santiago later had a positive at-home pregnancy test and then visited Lifetime.
- On two visits, Lifetime personnel told her the pregnancy was not viable and recommended a dilation and curettage (D&C); Santiago declined the procedure.
- Based on the advice that the pregnancy was not viable, Santiago resumed taking the medication.
- Santiago ultimately gave birth to a child, Z.O.S., who allegedly suffered severe birth defects caused by in utero exposure to the medication.
- Santiago and her husband, Armando Ocasio, sued Dr. Baker and Lifetime in Florida circuit court for medical malpractice, individually and as parents and natural guardians of Z.O.S.
- Defendants moved to compel arbitration under the signed arbitration agreement.
- The trial court entered a nonfinal order compelling arbitration, and the plaintiffs appealed that nonfinal order to Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal (reviewable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv)).

## Issues

1. Whether Florida’s medical-malpractice statutes in chapter 766 require malpractice disputes to be resolved only through the statute’s voluntary binding arbitration procedure or by trial, making a separate pre-dispute arbitration agreement unenforceable.
2. Whether plaintiffs who did not request voluntary binding arbitration under section 766.207 may rely on chapter 766’s statutory arbitration provisions to defeat a private arbitration agreement on public-policy grounds.

## Decision

- The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s nonfinal order compelling arbitration.
- The court held that chapter 766 does not prohibit health-care providers and patients from entering into private arbitration agreements for medical-malpractice claims.
- The court rejected the argument that chapter 766 creates an exclusive dispute-resolution path (statutory voluntary arbitration or trial) that bars enforcement of a private arbitration contract.
- The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs never requested statutory voluntary binding arbitration, they did not invoke and could not rely on the protections and procedures tied to that statutory option to avoid arbitration under their contract.

## Legal Principles

- Chapter 766’s voluntary binding arbitration procedure is optional; statutory language that parties “may elect” arbitration indicates a choice rather than a mandate.
- Absent clear legislative language barring private arbitration contracts for medical-malpractice disputes, Florida courts will enforce an otherwise valid arbitration agreement according to its terms.
- A party who does not elect voluntary binding arbitration under section 766.207 cannot use that statutory framework as a shield against a separate, enforceable agreement to arbitrate.
- Florida public policy, as reflected in arbitration law generally, favors enforcing agreements to arbitrate, and chapter 766 does not displace that policy by creating an exclusive remedy.

## Conclusion

The Second District affirmed an order compelling arbitration, holding that chapter 766’s voluntary binding arbitration procedure is elective and does not bar enforcement of a patient’s pre-dispute arbitration agreement covering medical-malpractice claims, particularly where the plaintiffs never requested statutory voluntary arbitration under section 766.207.


Santiago v. Baker, 135 So. 3d 569 (2014)