## Facts

- Kenneth Sarsha worked as operating manager and second-in-command at a Sears store in Springfield, Illinois.
- In late 1987, the store manager concluded Sarsha was dating a subordinate employee, Rebecca Schaertl.
- After consulting Sears’s regional office, Sears terminated Sarsha in January 1988 for “willful misconduct,” described as dating Schaertl after being warned not to date co-workers.
- Sears did not discharge Schaertl.
- Sarsha contended Sears had no written no-dating policy and no consistent long-standing practice barring managers from dating subordinates, and he denied receiving a clear job-threatening warning.
- Evidence in the record reflected conflicting management accounts about whether an informal no-dating rule existed and what conduct it prohibited, and it showed prior management tolerance of Sarsha dating another Sears employee.
- Sarsha alleged his discharge constituted age discrimination under the ADEA (he was 46) and sex discrimination under Title VII (male manager fired while female participant was not).

## Issues

1. Whether summary judgment was proper on the ADEA claim where Sears asserted a legitimate reason for discharge and the record lacked evidence permitting a reasonable inference of age-based intent or pretext.
2. Whether summary judgment was proper on the Title VII sex-discrimination claim where Sarsha offered evidence that the stated rule was unclear or inconsistently applied and that only the male participant in the relationship was terminated.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reviewed summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.
- The court applied the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework to both claims.
- ADEA: Affirmed summary judgment for Sears; Sarsha did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the stated reason was a pretext for age discrimination.
- Title VII: Reversed summary judgment and remanded; the record permitted a reasonable jury to find Sears’s rationale unworthy of belief and infer sex-based disparate treatment based on unequal discipline and disputed policy enforcement.

## Legal Principles

- On summary judgment in discrimination cases, the question is whether the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find discrimination when viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.
- Under McDonnell Douglas/Burdine, once an employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must produce evidence that the reason is pretextual or that discrimination more likely motivated the action.
- Pretext may be shown by evidence that the employer’s stated reason is unworthy of credence, including inconsistent explanations, unclear or unevenly enforced rules, and selective discipline.
- For Title VII disparate treatment, “similarly situated” comparator proof is not rigid; other circumstantial evidence, including different discipline imposed on participants in the same consensual relationship, can support an inference of sex discrimination.
- For an ADEA claim, disputed fairness or wisdom of the employer’s decision does not alone create a triable issue; the record must support a reasonable inference that age motivated the adverse action.

## Conclusion

The court held that Sarsha’s evidence did not support a triable inference of age discrimination, but it was sufficient to require a jury determination on whether Sears selectively enforced an unclear no-dating rule in a manner that discriminated on the basis of sex.


Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1993)