## Facts

- J.M. Huber Corporation operated an oriented-strand board (OSB) manufacturing plant in Commerce, Georgia.
- From 1982 through October 1994, plaintiffs resided at 220 Rob Belue Road in Commerce, Georgia, on a tract of approximately 70 acres; Mona Elaine Satterfield held sole title to the residence and land.
- The plant was located about 4,800 feet away (over nine-tenths of a mile), and Satterfield admitted she could not see the plant from her property.
- Plaintiffs alleged that chemicals and smoke released from the plant caused personal injuries and damaged their real and personal property, and they sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.
- Plaintiffs brought common-law claims under Georgia law for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se; their Clean Air Act citizen-suit counts had been dismissed in an earlier order.
- For trespass, Satterfield asserted that she saw smoke “invade” her property and claimed the invasion reduced her property value.
- The summary-judgment record reflected multiple potential sources of smoke and emissions in the area apart from Huber’s plant.
- Plaintiffs did not present scientific testing, air-dispersion modeling, or qualified testimony linking specific emissions from Huber’s plant to the specific injuries or property damage alleged.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue that emissions from Huber’s OSB plant caused their alleged personal injuries and property damage, as required for negligence-based toxic-tort claims under Georgia law.
2. Whether plaintiffs’ trespass and nuisance claims could proceed without competent proof that emissions from Huber’s plant actually reached plaintiffs’ property and caused a physical invasion (trespass) or a substantial, unreasonable interference with use and enjoyment (nuisance).
3. Whether any negligence or negligence per se claims were barred in whole or part by Georgia statutes of limitation and, in any event, failed for lack of proof of causation.

## Decision

- The court granted Huber’s motion for summary judgment on all remaining common-law claims.
- The court held plaintiffs failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Huber’s emissions were the cause of plaintiffs’ alleged personal injuries or property and personal-property damage.
- The court rejected the trespass claim because plaintiffs did not present reliable proof that Huber’s plant was the source of any airborne invasion of their property or that such an invasion caused compensable harm.
- The court rejected the nuisance claim because plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence tying any alleged interference with the use and enjoyment of the property to emissions from Huber’s plant.
- The court also concluded that statute-of-limitations principles independently defeated some negligence-based theories to the extent they sought recovery for time-barred injuries or damages.

## Legal Principles

- On summary judgment, the nonmovant must present specific admissible evidence showing a genuine dispute of material fact on each essential element; speculation, conclusory allegations, and unsupported lay beliefs are not enough.
- Under Georgia tort law, toxic-exposure claims require proof of causation (cause in fact and proximate cause). When the causal link depends on technical matters outside ordinary experience—especially where other plausible sources exist—plaintiffs must come forward with competent proof connecting the defendant’s emissions to the claimed harms.
- A trespass claim based on airborne substances requires proof of a physical invasion of the plaintiff’s property attributable to the defendant and resulting damages; a plaintiff must do more than assert that smoke appeared or that the defendant operated nearby.
- A nuisance claim requires proof of a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land and a causal connection to the defendant’s conduct; generalized complaints untethered to the defendant’s emissions will not support liability.
- Negligence per se requires proof of a violated legal standard and that the violation caused the injury complained of; negligence-based claims are also subject to applicable limitation periods, which can bar recovery for older alleged injuries or damages.

## Conclusion

The court entered summary judgment for Huber because plaintiffs did not present competent evidence—such as scientific data or qualified testimony—showing that emissions from Huber’s OSB plant, rather than other potential sources in the area, caused the claimed personal injuries or property damage; without proof of source and causation, plaintiffs’ trespass, nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se claims could not proceed, and some negligence-based theories were also time-barred.


Satterfield v. J.M. Huber Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1567 (1995)