## Facts

- Marguerite Scanlon and W.R. “Billy Bob” Crim became engaged in 1965.
- Scanlon alleged Crim promised to marry her and reaffirmed the engagement over several years.
- In approximately April 1970, Crim told Scanlon he would not marry her and soon married another woman.
- Scanlon sued Crim for breach of promise to marry, seeking damages.
- The trial court granted Crim summary judgment on the ground that the Texas Equal Rights Amendment barred the cause of action.
- Scanlon appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the Texas Equal Rights Amendment eliminated or barred the common-law cause of action for breach of promise to marry.
2. Whether summary judgment was proper when the defense rested on the contention that the cause of action was incompatible with constitutional sex-equality requirements.

## Decision

- The appellate court rejected the argument that the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, by itself, abolished the breach-of-promise cause of action.
- The court held that the constitutional equality provision did not bar the claim merely because the action had historically been brought more often by women.
- The court indicated that eliminating a long-recognized common-law cause of action was not justified on the asserted constitutional theory.
- The opinion’s ultimate appellate disposition is not reliably ascertainable from the available record.

## Legal Principles

- A constitutional equal-rights guarantee does not impliedly extinguish a common-law cause of action absent a clear conflict with equal treatment under law.
- A cause of action that is formally available on equal terms to both sexes is not invalid solely because it is more frequently used by one sex in practice.
- Substantial policy changes to common-law private-rights remedies generally require clear direction from the legislature or the state’s highest court rather than implication from broad constitutional language.

## Conclusion

The court concluded that the Texas Equal Rights Amendment did not, standing alone, abolish or bar a breach-of-promise-to-marry claim, and it refused to treat historical usage patterns as a constitutional basis to invalidate the cause of action.


Scanlon v. Crim, 500 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)