## Facts

- School of Visual Arts (SVA) and its human resources director, Laurie Pearlberg, sued Diane Kuprewicz, a former SVA employee, alleging a targeted campaign of harassment after her departure.
- Kuprewicz allegedly posted false online job listings indicating SVA was hiring for Pearlberg’s position, using accurate SVA contact information and directing applications to SVA personnel.
- Kuprewicz allegedly sent SVA’s human resources email address a similar job listing formatted to appear as if it originated from a major employment site, though no such listing existed there.
- Kuprewicz allegedly submitted Pearlberg’s SVA email address to pornographic websites, resulting in large volumes of unwanted sexually explicit emails, and allegedly caused pornographic catalogs to be mailed to Pearlberg at her work address.
- Kuprewicz allegedly sent pornographic electronic greeting cards to Pearlberg’s SVA email, including one purporting to be sent by another SVA employee.
- Plaintiffs alleged the influx of unwanted electronic communications consumed disk space and processing power and impaired SVA’s computer system resources.
- Plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctive relief; defendant cross-moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

## Issues

1. Whether allegations that unwanted electronic communications depleted computer resources stated a claim for trespass to chattels under New York law.
2. Whether false job postings and related conduct constituted actionable false designation of origin or dilution under the Lanham Act.
3. Whether the alleged conduct supported claims for defamation/trade libel, violation of New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50–51, or intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.

## Decision

- The court granted limited injunctive relief barring the sending of certain pornographic materials to plaintiffs.
- The court denied the motion to dismiss the trespass-to-chattels claim, holding the pleaded depletion of system resources sufficiently alleged intentional interference and harm to the computer system.
- The court granted the motion to dismiss the Lanham Act claims, holding the alleged conduct was not commercial use in connection with goods or services and was not properly pleaded as likely to cause cognizable confusion or dilution.
- The court dismissed defamation and trade libel claims for failure to plead defamatory meaning of the required type and, as to trade libel, adequate special damages.
- The court dismissed the Civil Rights Law §§ 50–51 claim because the alleged use of names/contact information was not for advertising purposes or purposes of trade within the statute.
- The court dismissed intentional interference with prospective economic advantage for failure to allege a specific prospective business relationship or contract that would have occurred absent the interference.

## Legal Principles

- On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, the court accepts pleaded facts as true and determines only whether the complaint states a legally cognizable claim.
- Trespass to chattels requires intentional, unauthorized interference with personal property in the plaintiff’s possession that results in harm; impairment of computer capacity or performance can satisfy the harm element when adequately pleaded.
- Lanham Act § 43(a) liability generally requires use in connection with goods or services of a commercial character; harassment-based postings not tied to commercial transactions may fail this element.
- Defamation requires a statement with the requisite defamatory meaning; trade libel requires, among other elements, properly pleaded special damages tied to business or product disparagement.
- New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50–51 is limited to unauthorized use of a person’s name, portrait, picture, or voice for advertising purposes or purposes of trade.
- Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage requires interference with an identifiable prospective business relationship and allegations that the relationship would have been consummated but for the defendant’s conduct.

## Conclusion

The court permitted a trespass-to-chattels claim to proceed where plaintiffs alleged that intentional, unsolicited electronic communications materially burdened and impaired a computer system, but it dismissed accompanying statutory and tort theories that required commercial use, defamatory meaning, statutory “trade or advertising” use, or interference with a specific prospective business relationship.


Sch. of Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz, 3 Misc. 3d 278, 771 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2003)