## Facts

- *Time* magazine published an April 20, 1992 cover story proposing an alternative theory for the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing.
- The story discussed “pilot David Lovejoy” in connection with arms and explosives dealings and used a photograph it believed depicted Lovejoy.
- The photograph actually depicted Michael Schafer, a former U.S. Army Special Forces member who later worked in private security and related businesses.
- After learning of the misidentification, Schafer demanded a correction; *Time* later published a retraction stating the person shown was not Lovejoy.
- Schafer alleged the publication falsely associated him with arms trafficking and involvement in events tied to the bombing, harming his reputation and business interests.
- Schafer sued *Time* for libel under Georgia law in federal court on diversity jurisdiction, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.

## Issues

1. Whether the jury instructions misstated Georgia libel law by suggesting “malicious defamation” requires defamatory words to be “deliberately calculated to injure.”
2. Whether the instructions likely misled the jury into applying an intent-to-harm requirement inconsistent with negligence-based liability for a private-figure plaintiff.
3. Whether the district court committed reversible error in evidentiary rulings allowing impeachment by prior acts and excluding certain proffered evidence.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit reversed the defense verdict and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the instruction that defamatory words must be “deliberately calculated to injure” to be “malicious” was erroneous and misleading under Georgia law.
- The instructional error was not harmless because it likely confused the jury about the applicable liability standard and could have improperly raised Schafer’s burden of proof.
- The court found no independent reversible error in the challenged evidentiary rulings, including impeachment cross-examination and exclusion of the referenced memorandum.

## Legal Principles

- Under Georgia law, a private-figure plaintiff may establish libel liability based on negligent publication (failure to exercise ordinary care regarding truth or falsity).
- “Malice” in Georgia’s statutory libel phrasing does not necessarily mean a subjective, specific intent to injure; jury instructions may not impose an intent-to-harm element for basic liability.
- First Amendment limits require proof of constitutional “actual malice” (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard) for punitive damages, even where compensatory liability may rest on negligence.
- A jury instruction that conflates negligence-based liability with intent-to-injure standards is reversible when it likely affects the verdict.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit ordered a new trial because the jury was improperly instructed that libel required an intent “deliberately calculated to injure,” a misstatement that could have prevented liability despite negligent misidentification and publication under Georgia law.


Schafer v. Time, Inc., 142 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1998)