Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 572 U.S. 291 (2014)

Facts

  • Following Supreme Court decisions permitting limited race-conscious admissions and rejecting certain mechanical systems, Michigan voters approved Proposal 2 in 2006.
  • Proposal 2 added a provision to the Michigan Constitution barring public institutions from “discriminating against” or granting “preferential treatment” based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in public education, employment, and contracting.
  • Advocacy organizations and individuals challenged the amendment, arguing that banning race-conscious admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause under the political-process (political-restructuring) doctrine associated with cases such as Hunter v. Erickson and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.
  • The federal district court upheld the amendment as applied to public university admissions.
  • The en banc Sixth Circuit reversed in relevant part, holding the amendment unconstitutional because it altered the political process in a way that uniquely burdened racial minorities seeking race-conscious admissions policies.

Issues

  1. Whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state electorate from amending the state constitution to bar race- and sex-based “preferential treatment” in public university admissions.
  2. Whether the political-process doctrine invalidates a facially race-neutral state constitutional amendment that reallocates decisionmaking authority over affirmative action from university bodies to the statewide electorate.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and upheld Proposal 2.
  • A plurality concluded the Constitution does not authorize federal courts to set aside Michigan’s decision to place this policy choice with the voters.
  • The plurality rejected extending the political-process doctrine to invalidate the amendment, distinguishing earlier precedents as involving state action that fostered racial discrimination or inflicted a specific race-based injury.
  • Concurring Justices agreed the amendment was constitutional, though some would further limit or reject the political-process doctrine and emphasized that race-conscious admissions may be permitted but are not constitutionally required.
  • Two Justices dissented, concluding the amendment imposed a unique political burden on racial minorities by making race-conscious admissions harder to obtain than other admissions preferences.
  • The Equal Protection Clause permits, but does not require, race-conscious admissions programs consistent with prior precedent; states may choose to prohibit such preferences through ordinary democratic processes.
  • A facially neutral ban on race-based preferences is not invalid under Equal Protection absent a showing of discriminatory purpose or a doctrine-specific basis to treat the restructuring as a race-based injury.
  • The political-process doctrine is limited and does not automatically invalidate voter-enacted reallocations of policymaking authority concerning race-conscious measures where the law does not, by its design or operation, encourage or foster racial discrimination.

Conclusion

Michigan’s voters could constitutionally amend the state constitution to prohibit race-based preferences in public university admissions, and the Equal Protection Clause did not require courts to invalidate that choice under the political-process doctrine.