## Facts

- Dorothy Schwartz alleged personal injuries from two automobile accidents occurring ten days apart.
- In the first accident (Aug. 13, 1960), Dorothy was a passenger in a car that was struck after two other vehicles collided; she alleged injuries to her head, neck, and shoulders.
- In the second accident (Aug. 23, 1960), Dorothy was a passenger in a car that was struck by a different driver; she alleged additional injuries and aggravation of the earlier injuries.
- Dorothy pleaded she could not allege the extent to which each accident caused or contributed to her condition and could not apportion her complained-of injuries between the two occurrences.
- Dorothy and her husband, Clarence Schwartz, filed a multi-count complaint joining claims arising from both accidents; Clarence asserted corresponding loss-of-consortium claims.
- Adelia Schwartz filed a separate action for her own injuries arising from the first accident.
- Defendants moved to sever the joined claims into separate actions corresponding to each accident, arguing separate negligence questions and risk of jury confusion.
- The trial court granted severance; it then consolidated the first-accident claims (Dorothy’s first-accident count, Clarence’s consortium claim tied to that accident, and Adelia’s first-accident suit) for trial.
- A jury returned verdicts for all defendants in the consolidated first-accident trial, and judgments were entered; plaintiffs appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by severing claims arising from two accidents into separate trials where the complaint alleged overlapping injuries that could not be apportioned between occurrences.
2. Whether joinder was authorized because the alleged liability arose from the same “transaction or series of transactions” and presented a common question of fact concerning causation and damages.
3. Whether severance was premature because it was ordered without an adequate record developed through discovery on medical causation and allocation of injury.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the judgments entered for defendants in the first-accident trial.
- The court held the trial court abused its discretion in ordering severance of the two-accident claims.
- The cause was remanded for further proceedings consistent with allowing the claims to proceed together.

## Legal Principles

- Claims may be joined when the alleged liability arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions and a common question of fact exists.
- When a plaintiff alleges overlapping injuries from multiple occurrences and cannot reasonably apportion damages among them, separate trials can unfairly prejudice the plaintiff by enabling each group of defendants to attribute the injury to the other occurrence.
- Concerns that a jury may be confused by multiple defendants and related claims generally can be addressed through case management tools such as instructions and verdict forms rather than severance.
- Severance decisions are discretionary but may constitute reversible error when ordered on an undeveloped record, particularly where discovery may bear on the feasibility of separating causation and damages.
- Procedure may permit different outcomes for different defendants within one action, including separate judgments, without requiring fragmentation into separate lawsuits.

## Conclusion

The appellate court held that severing the two-accident claims was an abuse of discretion because the pleaded inability to allocate injuries created a common causation-and-damages question best resolved in a single proceeding, and it reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with joinder.


Schwartz v. Swan, 63 Ill. App. 2d 148, 211 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965)