## Facts

- Ann C. Schweiss worked for Chrysler Motors Corporation from January 1984 until her discharge on February 8, 1989.
- Shortly before her discharge, Schweiss contacted OSHA to report alleged legal and workplace-safety violations at the assembly plant.
- Chrysler stated it terminated Schweiss for excessive absenteeism; Schweiss alleged the discharge was retaliation for whistleblowing.
- Schweiss filed a Missouri tort claim for wrongful discharge under the state’s public-policy exception to at-will employment, alleging discharge for reporting violations of law to public authorities.
- Chrysler argued the state claim was preempted by OSHA’s antiretaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c), and also by LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
- The district court denied remand, dismissed Schweiss’s supervisor as a defendant, and dismissed the case with prejudice on OSHA-preemption grounds without reaching LMRA § 301.

## Issues

1. Whether OSHA § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c), preempts a Missouri common-law wrongful-discharge claim alleging retaliatory discharge for reporting workplace-safety violations to OSHA.
2. Whether LMRA § 301 preempts the claim because it is substantially dependent on interpreting a collective-bargaining agreement (left for resolution on remand).

## Decision

- The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held OSHA § 11(c) does not expressly preempt state wrongful-discharge remedies and does not show congressional intent to occupy the field.
- The court held the Missouri tort remedy did not conflict with OSHA’s purposes or enforcement scheme and therefore was not conflict-preempted.
- The court declined to decide LMRA § 301 preemption and directed the district court to consider it on remand.

## Legal Principles

- A federal whistleblower remedy does not, by itself, displace state-law remedies absent clear congressional intent or an actual conflict with federal objectives.
- OSHA § 11(c) contains no express preemption of state retaliatory-discharge remedies and does not indicate field preemption of employment-related tort claims.
- Conflict preemption requires more than a different remedial path; the state claim must interfere with federal regulatory authority or stand as an obstacle to the federal statute’s objectives.
- State public-policy wrongful-discharge actions protecting employees who report legal violations can be consistent with, and supportive of, OSHA’s goal of safe working conditions.
- LMRA § 301 preemption must be addressed when a state claim turns on interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement; where not resolved below, it may be remanded for initial determination.

## Conclusion

The court held that OSHA’s antiretaliation provision does not preempt Missouri’s public-policy wrongful-discharge tort for an employee allegedly fired for reporting safety violations, reversed the dismissal with prejudice, and remanded for further proceedings including consideration of any LMRA § 301 preemption defense.


Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1990)