## Facts

- Franco Scoppola, an Italian national, was convicted of serious offenses, including murder, and ultimately received a life sentence.
- Under Italian law, his sentence also carried a permanent ban from public office that entailed automatic loss of electoral rights.
- Italian legislation provided automatic disenfranchisement for persons sentenced to more than five years’ imprisonment and for certain serious offenses, including offenses against the State.
- The loss of voting rights followed by operation of law from the conviction and sentence, not from a separate individualized judicial order.
- Scoppola challenged the automatic disenfranchisement as incompatible with the right to free elections under Protocol 1, Article 3.

## Issues

1. Whether Italy’s statutory disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners, as applied to Scoppola, violated Protocol 1, Article 3 (right to free elections).
2. Whether Protocol 1, Article 3 requires disenfranchisement to be imposed through an individualized judicial decision with case-specific reasons.
3. How much discretion states retain to restrict prisoner voting rights without impairing the essence of the right to vote.

## Decision

- The Grand Chamber held, by majority, that there was no violation of Protocol 1, Article 3.
- The Court distinguished prior precedent condemning blanket bans, finding Italy’s scheme was not “general, automatic and indiscriminate” in its reach.
- The Court rejected a general requirement that disenfranchisement must be ordered by a judge with individualized reasons.
- The Court concluded Italy had not exceeded its margin of appreciation in regulating electoral restrictions for criminal offenders.

## Legal Principles

- Protocol 1, Article 3 protects the right to vote, but permits restrictions that pursue legitimate aims and do not impair the essence of the right.
- Blanket, undifferentiated prisoner voting bans are incompatible with Protocol 1, Article 3.
- A statutory scheme may be compatible where it is targeted and graded, including by linking disenfranchisement to offense seriousness and/or sentence length, and allowing restoration in defined circumstances.
- Disenfranchisement need not be imposed through an individualized judicial order in every case; legislative imposition is not, by itself, disproportionate.
- States have a margin of appreciation in the electoral field, subject to review for arbitrariness or measures that prevent free expression of the people’s choice of legislature.

## Conclusion

The Grand Chamber found that Italy’s automatic disenfranchisement tied to specified offenses and sentence thresholds fell within permissible limits under Protocol 1, Article 3 because it was not a blanket ban and reflected a proportionate, graduated legislative judgment within the state’s discretion.


Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 2012)