## Facts

- Mr. and Mrs. Scott rode as passengers in their own automobile and permitted Marshall to drive.
- An accident occurred while Marshall was driving, and the Scotts were injured.
- Mrs. Scott sued Marshall for damages for her personal injuries.
- Mr. Scott joined as a plaintiff, claiming special damages said to flow from Mrs. Scott’s injuries, including:
  - certain medical expenses incurred or to be incurred for Mrs. Scott,
  - the cost of hiring household help because of her incapacity, and
  - loss of consortium and services.
- British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act § 71 required a non-paying passenger to prove “gross negligence” to recover damages from the driver for the passenger’s injuries.
- Marshall was not found to have been grossly negligent, so Mrs. Scott’s claim for her injuries was barred by § 71.
- The Scotts argued that § 71 did not govern Mr. Scott’s claims and that he could recover on proof of ordinary negligence.

## Issues

1. Whether Motor Vehicle Act § 71, which bars an injured guest passenger’s recovery absent gross negligence, also bars the spouse’s claims for medical expenses, household-help costs, and loss of consortium/services arising from the passenger’s injuries.
2. Whether the spouse’s claims may proceed on proof of ordinary negligence even though the injured passenger cannot recover because gross negligence is not shown.

## Decision

- The court held that § 71 barred Mrs. Scott’s personal injury claim because gross negligence was not established.
- The court held that § 71 did not bar Mr. Scott’s claims for his own losses arising from Mrs. Scott’s injuries.
- The court treated Mr. Scott’s claims as a separate cause of action not eliminated by a statutory limit directed at an “injured passenger’s” right to recover for her own injuries.
- As a result, Mr. Scott’s claims could be assessed under the ordinary negligence standard, rather than the gross-negligence threshold that defeated Mrs. Scott’s claim.

## Legal Principles

- A guest-passenger statute requiring proof of gross negligence may bar the injured passenger’s claim for her own personal injuries, but it does not automatically bar a spouse’s claim for the spouse’s own losses unless the statute clearly does so.
- Claims for medical expenses incurred by a spouse, reasonable replacement-household-help expenses, and loss of consortium/services can constitute a distinct cause of action belonging to the uninjured spouse, even though the losses arise from injuries to the other spouse.
- Courts read statutory limits on common-law civil liability narrowly where the legislature has not clearly taken away related causes of action held by persons other than the statutorily described claimant.
- Where the spouse’s claim is not caught by the guest-passenger limitation, the standard of fault for that claim remains ordinary negligence.

## Conclusion

Scott v. Marshall held that British Columbia’s guest-passenger gross-negligence requirement barred Mrs. Scott’s claim for her personal injuries, but it did not extend to extinguish Mr. Scott’s separate claims for expenses and loss of consortium/services arising from her injuries, which could proceed on ordinary negligence.


Scott v. Marshall, [1965] 55 D.L.R. 2d 58 (1965)