Facts
- In a crowded marketplace, Shepherd (the defendant) threw a lit squib (a small firework) into the crowd.
- The squib caused immediate danger and apprehension among bystanders.
- Two individuals, Willis and Ryal, each picked up and threw the squib further away in quick succession, acting instinctively to protect themselves from harm.
- The squib eventually landed near Scott (the claimant), exploded, and caused him serious injury, specifically the loss of use of one eye.
- Scott brought legal action against Shepherd, claiming trespass to the person.
- The central factual issue was whether the injury was directly caused by Shepherd’s initial act or if the intervening actions of Willis and Ryal broke the chain of causation.
Issues
- Whether Shepherd’s act of throwing the squib constituted a direct cause of Scott’s injury, or if the subsequent actions of Willis and Ryal were independent intervening acts (novus actus interveniens) breaking the causal chain.
- Whether the instinctive, reflexive reactions of Willis and Ryal could be seen as a natural and foreseeable response to Shepherd’s dangerous act.
- Whether Shepherd should be held liable for harm resulting from a sequence of events initiated by his intentional act, even where other actors are involved.
Decision
- The court dismissed Shepherd’s appeal and found him liable for trespass and the resulting injury to Scott.
- It held that the acts of Willis and Ryal were not independent, voluntary acts but were compelled by immediate danger and were reasonable, foreseeable reactions.
- The court determined the chain of causation remained intact; the injury to Scott was a direct consequence of Shepherd’s original wrongful act.
- Shepherd’s intent in initiating a dangerous situation in a crowded place was sufficient to establish liability for the ultimate harm suffered.
Legal Principles
- For trespass to the person, the defendant’s act must be intentional and directly cause harm; the element of directness covers actions that are the natural, probable consequence of the initial act.
- An intervening act does not break the chain of causation where subsequent reactions are immediate, reflexive, and foreseeable in response to the danger created by the defendant.
- The doctrine of novus actus interveniens requires that an intervening event be independent and voluntary to break causation; instinctive acts of self-preservation by intermediaries do not qualify.
- Liability attaches to the initial wrongdoer when harm occurs through a foreseeable chain of direct acts, even if multiple parties are involved.
Conclusion
Scott v Shepherd is a foundational case on causation in trespass to the person, confirming that an initial wrongdoer remains liable for harm following a natural sequence of reflexive responses to their intentional act, with the chain of causation unbroken by self-preservative actions of others.