## Facts

- Shepherd threw a lit squib (small explosive firework) into a crowded market house.
- The squib landed on Yates’s stall; Willis, seeking to protect himself and the goods, picked it up and threw it away.
- The squib then landed near Ryal, who threw it on to protect his own goods.
- The squib struck Scott in the face and exploded, destroying sight in one eye.
- Scott sued Shepherd in trespass and assault, alleging the injury was the direct result of Shepherd’s unlawful act.
- A jury found for Scott.

## Issues

1. Whether Scott’s injury was the direct and immediate result of Shepherd’s act for purposes of trespass, or merely consequential such that the proper remedy was an action on the case.
2. Whether Willis’s and Ryal’s acts of throwing the squib were independent, voluntary intervening causes that severed causation, or justified defensive acts treated as a continuation of Shepherd’s initial force.

## Decision

- The court affirmed judgment for Scott.
- Shepherd was liable in trespass because Scott’s injury was deemed the direct and immediate result of Shepherd’s wrongful act.
- The intervening throws by Willis and Ryal did not break the causal chain; their conduct was treated as compelled by self-preservation and defense of property.
- Dissent (Blackstone J.): the harm to Scott was consequential rather than immediate because it followed voluntary acts of third parties; the proper action was on the case, not trespass.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant who initiates a dangerous unlawful force may be treated as responsible for the ensuing harm while that force continues to operate.
- Justified defensive reactions by third parties to avoid imminent harm may not constitute a new intervening cause that relieves the original wrongdoer of liability.
- Trespass may lie even without personal physical contact by the defendant where injury is inflicted through an instrument or other “mean,” so long as the operative force is legally attributed to the defendant.
- In assessing trespass versus case, the key inquiry is whether the injury is legally characterized as direct and immediate (majority) or consequential following a new human agency (dissent).

## Conclusion

The court held that throwing a lit squib into a crowd created a continuing wrongful force culminating in Scott’s injury, and that others’ defensive acts in passing the squib along did not interrupt causation, permitting recovery against the original thrower in trespass.


Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1773)