## Facts

- Vincent E. Scott was convicted of robbery under D.C. Code § 22-2901 (1967) and sentenced to 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment.
- Scott testified at trial and maintained his innocence; the jury found him guilty.
- On direct appeal, Scott challenged the sentencing process rather than the trial proceedings leading to conviction.
- At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge stated repeatedly that he disbelieved Scott’s exculpatory testimony.
- The judge also indicated he would have been disposed to impose a lesser sentence had Scott pleaded guilty rather than gone to trial.

## Issues

1. Whether any reversible error occurred in the proceedings leading to Scott’s robbery conviction.
2. Whether a sentencing judge may impose a harsher sentence, in whole or in part, because the defendant refused to plead guilty and insisted on trial.
3. Whether, and under what limits, a sentencing judge may treat disbelief of a defendant’s trial testimony as an aggravating sentencing factor.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the conviction, finding the pre-sentencing proceedings free from reversible error.
- The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.
- The court held that appellate review may scrutinize the sentencing process when the record indicates reliance on improper or constitutionally suspect considerations.
- The court concluded the sentencing judge’s on-the-record rationale created an unacceptable risk that Scott was penalized for exercising the right to plead not guilty, stand trial, and testify.

## Legal Principles

- Although sentencing courts have broad discretion regarding information considered, the sentencing process is reviewable to ensure reliance on reliable and proper factors relevant to legitimate sentencing purposes.
- A defendant may not be punished for exercising constitutional rights, including the right to plead not guilty and proceed to trial.
- A sentencing judge may not condition leniency on surrender of trial rights by treating refusal to plead guilty as a reason for increased punishment.
- While a defendant’s candor may bear on sentencing, using mere disbelief of the defendant’s trial testimony as a proxy for punishing the assertion of innocence or the decision to testify is improper without adequate safeguards and a sound basis.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit upheld Scott’s robbery conviction but required resentencing because the judge’s stated reasons suggested the sentence was increased due to Scott’s decision to go to trial and maintain innocence, considerations that cannot serve as punishment for exercising constitutional rights.


Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969)