Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984)

Facts

  • Maryland regulated charitable solicitation by barring charitable organizations from paying or incurring fundraising expenses exceeding 25% of funds raised for a campaign.
  • The statute allowed the Secretary of State to waive the cap if it would effectively prevent the organization from raising contributions.
  • Joseph H. Munson Company, Inc., a professional fundraising firm, contracted with charitable organizations for campaigns in which fees could exceed the statutory cap.
  • A charitable client was reluctant to continue using Munson because of the cap, and the Secretary of State warned Munson that noncompliance could result in prosecution.
  • Munson sought declaratory and injunctive relief, bringing a facial First Amendment overbreadth challenge.
  • Maryland trial and intermediate appellate courts upheld the statute; the state’s highest court reversed, finding standing and holding the statute unconstitutional.

Issues

  1. Whether a professional fundraiser has standing to assert a facial First Amendment overbreadth challenge based on the rights of its charitable clients.
  2. Whether Maryland’s 25% fundraising-expense cap, even with a discretionary waiver, is facially overbroad because it unconstitutionally restricts protected charitable solicitation.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment invalidating the statute.
  • Munson had Article III standing because the statute caused threatened and actual injury, including the risk of enforcement and harm to business relationships.
  • Prudential limits on third-party standing did not bar the suit because charitable solicitation is central to Munson’s work and its interests aligned with the charities’ speech interests.
  • The 25% cap was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and the waiver provision did not cure the defect.
  • Charitable solicitation is protected by the First Amendment because it is intertwined with informational and persuasive expression.
  • In First Amendment overbreadth cases, courts may relax prudential standing limits to permit litigants to raise the rights of others when a law’s existence may deter protected expression.
  • A fixed percentage cap on fundraising costs is constitutionally suspect when it treats fundraising “efficiency” as a proxy for fraud and restricts solicitation on that basis.
  • The state must pursue anti-fraud and donor-protection interests through measures that are more closely fitted to those interests, such as disclosure, recordkeeping, and targeted prohibitions on misrepresentation.
  • A discretionary waiver does not save a speech-burdening percentage limit where the core restriction is invalid and the waiver process itself risks deterrence of protected solicitation.

Conclusion

The Court held that a professional fundraiser could bring a facial overbreadth challenge and invalidated Maryland’s 25% fundraising-expense cap because it broadly restricted protected charitable solicitation based on fundraising ratios rather than narrowly targeting fraud, and the waiver mechanism did not remedy the constitutional defect.