## Facts

- Robert E. Curry, an enlisted U.S. Army soldier stationed in Germany, was tried by a general court-martial and convicted of two homicides arising from a drunk-driving incident.
- The court-martial sentenced Curry to hard labor for twelve years, reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, and a dishonorable discharge.
- Under the UCMJ review process, the convening authority approved the findings and sentence.
- The Army Court of Military Review affirmed the conviction but reduced Curry’s sentence to eight years.
- The U.S. Court of Military Appeals denied further review.
- Curry also sought administrative relief from the Board for Correction of Military Records, which was denied.
- After military review ended, Curry filed a federal civil action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Army and other Army officials.
- Curry did not focus on specific trial errors; instead, he argued that the court-martial framework violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because the convening authority holds multiple roles in court-martial proceedings, including referring charges and selecting court-martial members.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the Army, rejecting Curry’s constitutional challenge, and Curry appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the UCMJ provisions giving a convening authority multiple roles in court-martial proceedings—including referring charges and selecting members—violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Secretary of the Army.
- The court held that the challenged UCMJ arrangement, by itself, does not deny due process.
- The court treated Curry’s claim as a facial, structural constitutional attack on Congress’s design of military justice and concluded that it failed in light of the military context and the safeguards built into the UCMJ.
- Because Curry’s challenge targeted the general framework rather than showing unlawful command influence or other concrete unfairness in his case, his conviction was left intact.

## Legal Principles

- Congress has broad constitutional authority to regulate the armed forces, and federal courts give substantial weight to Congress’s choices in structuring military justice.
- Due process in courts-martial is assessed in the military setting; civilian criminal procedure is not the sole measure of what the Constitution requires for service members.
- The convening authority’s combined functions (such as charge referral, member selection, and post-trial action) are not unconstitutional per se when Congress has authorized them as part of a military disciplinary scheme.
- Statutory protections against unfairness—such as the UCMJ’s bar on unlawful command influence (Article 37), rules supporting judicial independence, and layered appellate review within the military system—support the conclusion that the framework can provide a fair tribunal.
- A broad facial challenge to the design of the court-martial process, without a showing of actual improper influence or specific prejudice, is an insufficient basis for federal collateral relief from a finalized court-martial conviction.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Secretary of the Army, holding that Curry’s Fifth Amendment due process challenge to the UCMJ’s convening authority framework failed because the military justice system’s congressionally authorized structure—tempered by statutory protections and military appellate review—was not unconstitutional on its face.


Secretary of the Army v. Curry, 595 F.2d. 873 (1979)