## Facts

- Washington’s Community Protection Act of 1990 authorizes civil commitment of “sexually violent predators” based on a mental abnormality or personality disorder creating a likelihood of predatory sexual violence.
- Andre Brigham Young, with multiple rape convictions, was petitioned for commitment one day before his scheduled prison release.
- A jury found Young met the statutory criteria, and he was committed to Washington’s Special Commitment Center (SCC), overseen by Superintendent Mark Seling.
- Young argued that commitment under the Act violated the Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses.
- Washington courts upheld the Act as a civil, treatment-oriented commitment scheme rather than criminal punishment.
- Young sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, again asserting federal constitutional violations.
- After intervening Supreme Court precedent upholding a similar commitment scheme as civil and nonpunitive, the federal district court denied relief.
- The Ninth Circuit held Young could pursue an as-applied challenge asserting that SCC confinement conditions made the scheme punitive in effect and thus unconstitutional under Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto principles.

## Issues

1. Whether a person committed under a statute that is facially civil and nonpunitive may obtain release by arguing the statute is punitive as applied to him for purposes of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.
2. Whether allegedly punitive conditions of confinement can reclassify a civil commitment scheme as criminal punishment for double jeopardy or ex post facto analysis in habeas.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded.
- The Court held that a statute determined to be civil cannot be deemed punitive as applied to a single individual for Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto purposes to justify release.
- The Court rejected the approach that individualized confinement conditions could convert a facially civil commitment scheme into criminal punishment under those clauses.
- The Court noted that unconstitutional conditions may be challenged through other constitutional avenues, but those claims do not alter the scheme’s civil classification for double jeopardy or ex post facto analysis.

## Legal Principles

- For Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto analysis, whether a statutory scheme is civil or punitive is determined by legislative intent and the statute’s structure as a whole, not by its application to one detainee.
- Practical effects may be considered only to determine whether the statute, on its face, is so punitive in purpose or effect as to override civil intent; this inquiry is statute-wide and requires “clearest proof.”
- Conditions-of-confinement challenges at civil commitment facilities may proceed under due process or civil-rights actions, but they do not transform a civil statute into criminal punishment for double jeopardy or ex post facto purposes.
- Habeas relief in the form of release is unavailable on a theory that a facially civil commitment law becomes punitive solely due to alleged punitive conditions affecting a particular individual.

## Conclusion

The Court held that once a sexually violent predator civil commitment statute has been classified as civil and nonpunitive, an individual detainee cannot obtain release by recharacterizing the scheme as punitive as applied under the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses, though other remedies may exist to challenge unlawful confinement conditions.


Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001)