## Facts

- Joseph Sessa, Jr., an experienced standardbred horseman, purchased the standardbred racehorse Tarport Conaway from Gene Riegle and co-owners.
- Sessa learned of the horse through Robert J. Maloney, a knowledgeable horseman, and sent Maloney to the seller’s Ohio farm as his agent with a $25,000 check to complete the purchase if satisfied.
- Maloney had unrestricted access to inspect the horse; although Sessa initially instructed that a veterinarian be retained, no pre-sale veterinary exam was obtained.
- After Maloney reported favorably, Sessa spoke with Riegle, who stated Sessa would like the horse, that it was “a good one,” and that it was “sound”; Maloney then delivered the check and the sale closed.
- The horse remained with the sellers for about two weeks before shipping; the court found it was properly cared for during that period.
- Upon arrival at Freehold Raceway, a veterinarian diagnosed tendinitis in both front legs; the cause was not determined.
- Sessa demanded rescission and return of the price; Riegle refused.
- After the tendinitis subsided, the horse later developed hind-leg lameness diagnosed as intermittent claudication caused by iliac artery thrombosis; expert testimony did not establish the thrombosis existed at or before the sale.
- Sessa again sought rescission and was refused; the horse was later returned to training and raced multiple times, earning modest purses, and may have had breeding value.
- Sessa sued in diversity for breach of express warranty and implied warranties under U.C.C. Article 2; the case was tried to the court.

## Issues

1. Whether the seller’s statements that the horse was “a good one” and “sound” created an express warranty under U.C.C. § 2-313.
2. Whether the horse was unmerchantable at the time of sale under U.C.C. § 2-314 based on post-sale tendinitis and later intermittent claudication.
3. Whether an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arose under U.C.C. § 2-315 given the buyer’s selection process and use of an inspecting agent.
4. Whether the buyer proved that any alleged defect existed at or before the time of sale.

## Decision

- Judgment was entered for the defendants on all warranty claims after a bench trial.
- The court held the seller’s “good one” and “sound” statements were opinion or commendation in context and did not constitute an express warranty.
- The court held the buyer did not prove a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability because the horse was not shown to be unfit for ordinary racing purposes at the time of sale.
- The court held no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arose because the buyer did not rely on the seller’s skill or judgment; the buyer relied primarily on his agent’s evaluation and his own experience.
- The buyer failed to carry the burden of proving that the thrombosis/intermittent claudication existed at or before the sale; the appellate court affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- An express warranty under U.C.C. § 2-313 requires an affirmation of fact or promise that becomes part of the basis of the bargain; sales talk or commendation, assessed in context, may be non-warranting opinion.
- In transactions between knowledgeable parties, generalized statements such as “good” and “sound” may be treated as opinion rather than enforceable factual guarantees.
- A buyer pursuing warranty remedies after acceptance bears the burden to prove the defect existed at the time of sale; later manifestation alone is insufficient.
- Merchantability under U.C.C. § 2-314 turns on fitness for ordinary purposes at the time of sale; proof of subsequent performance may support a finding of merchantability.
- An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under U.C.C. § 2-315 requires actual reliance on the seller’s skill or judgment; use of an independent agent and the buyer’s own expertise may negate reliance.

## Conclusion

The court rejected warranty liability for the sale of a racehorse where the seller’s assurances were treated as non-warranting opinion, and where the buyer—an experienced participant who relied on an inspecting agent—failed to prove that the later-diagnosed condition existed at or before the sale or that the horse was unfit for ordinary racing purposes at the time of contracting.


Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977)