Facts
- James Garcia Dimaya, a lawful permanent resident admitted in 1992, was convicted in California of first-degree residential burglary in 2007 and 2009 and received two-year prison sentences for each.
- The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging the burglaries were “aggravated felonies” because they were “crimes of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), incorporated by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
- Section 16 defines “crime of violence” through an elements clause (§ 16(a)) and a residual clause (§ 16(b)), which covers any felony that, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk” that physical force may be used during the offense.
- An Immigration Judge ordered removal; the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, concluding residential burglary inherently presents a risk of physical violence.
- While Dimaya’s petition for review was pending, the Supreme Court invalidated a similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act as unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States (2015).
- The Ninth Circuit applied Johnson, held § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague as used in removal, and vacated the removal order.
Issues
- Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into the INA’s “aggravated felony” definition triggering removal, is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
- Whether § 16(b) requires a categorical “ordinary case” analysis (rather than a case-specific inquiry), and, if so, whether that interpretive method contributes to unconstitutional indeterminacy.
- Whether void-for-vagueness review applies with comparable force in civil removal proceedings given the severity of deportation consequences.
Decision
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in a 5–4 decision and held § 16(b), as incorporated into the INA, is unconstitutionally vague.
- The Court concluded § 16(b) shares the same defects identified in Johnson: it requires courts to imagine an offense’s “ordinary case” and then decide whether the risk of force is “substantial,” producing unpredictable and arbitrary results.
- The Court rejected claimed textual distinctions from the ACCA residual clause (e.g., “physical force” vs. “physical injury,” “in the course of committing the offense”) as insufficient to make the standard determinate.
- The Court held § 16(b) is properly read to require the categorical approach in this context, making Johnson’s reasoning applicable.
- The Court rejected the argument that vagueness standards should be relaxed in immigration removal proceedings because deportation is a severe deprivation and due process protections apply.
Legal Principles
- A statute is void for vagueness when it fails to give fair notice of the conduct it covers and invites arbitrary enforcement.
- Risk-based residual clauses requiring an “ordinary case” categorical analysis plus an indeterminate risk threshold can violate due process because they demand speculation and yield inconsistent outcomes.
- The void-for-vagueness doctrine applies in civil proceedings when the consequences are grave, including removal.
- When a provision is interpreted to require a categorical assessment of an offense “by its nature,” constitutional vagueness analysis evaluates the uncertainty created by that abstraction rather than the facts of a specific conviction.
Conclusion
The Court held that § 16(b)’s residual definition of “crime of violence,” when used to classify an offense as an INA “aggravated felony” for removal purposes, violates due process because its categorical “ordinary case” inquiry and undefined “substantial risk” standard create unconstitutional uncertainty and permit arbitrary application.