## Facts

- William Shade served on active duty in the U.S. Army from October 1965 to September 1967.
- Service treatment records documented treatment for dermatitis in April 1966 and April 1967.
- Shade sought service connection for a skin disorder in 2000.
- VA denied the claim in 2002 and again in a 2003 statement of the case, citing lack of a current diagnosis and lack of a link to service; the denial became final.
- In 2006, Shade applied to reopen the claim and submitted a private medical report diagnosing chronic dermatitis and stating it had been present for years.
- The Regional Office and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals refused to reopen, reasoning that the new evidence did not provide a medical nexus to service.

## Issues

1. Whether evidence establishing a current diagnosis, without a nexus opinion, can be “new and material” under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) to reopen a previously denied service-connection claim.
2. Whether the Board erred by requiring new evidence to address every previously unproven element, rather than assessing whether it raised a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim in light of VA’s duty to assist.

## Decision

- The Court reversed the Board’s refusal to reopen the skin-disorder claim and remanded for further proceedings.
- The Court held the 2006 private report was new and material evidence under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a).
- The Court concluded the Board applied an overly demanding standard by insisting the new evidence contain a nexus opinion and by failing to consider whether reopening, with VA assistance, could produce the missing nexus evidence.

## Legal Principles

- Reopening under 38 U.S.C. § 5108 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) requires a “low threshold”; new evidence need not prove the claim to be material.
- New evidence is material if it relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating it when considered with the existing record.
- New and material evidence is not required as to each previously unproven element of service connection; addressing one missing element may be sufficient.
- Materiality must be evaluated in the context of VA’s duty to assist, including whether reopening would reasonably trigger development such as a VA examination or medical opinion that could help establish nexus.
- The Board commits legal error when it effectively makes reopening contingent on submission of evidence that guarantees a favorable outcome or supplies every missing element.

## Conclusion

The Court held that a new medical diagnosis can be material even without a nexus opinion because reopening is meant to be accessible and must account for VA’s duty to assist; the Board therefore erred by demanding nexus evidence at the reopening stage.


Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010)