## Facts

- Nancy C. Shaffer worked at National Can Corporation’s Morrisville, Pennsylvania plant from March 13, 1975 to March 27, 1981, first as a secretary-receptionist and later as a billing clerk.
- In June 1977, Pat Dettorre became plant manager and allegedly engaged in an ongoing course of sexual harassment until Shaffer left.
- Dettorre allegedly made repeated unwanted social and sexual advances, persisted after refusals, and made public, pressuring invitations.
- He allegedly implied workplace retaliation if Shaffer did not “play ball,” referenced his power in the plant (including calling himself the “king-pin”), and suggested “things could get better or worse” based on her compliance.
- He allegedly made sexualized comments about women employees’ bodies and suggested Shaffer wear more revealing clothing.
- Shaffer alleged that after she rejected Dettorre, he retaliated by mistreating or ignoring her, excluding her from work-related events, and making it difficult or impossible to do her job.
- Shaffer alleged severe mental anguish and that the conditions forced her to resign.
- Shaffer sued under Title VII for sexual harassment and asserted pendent Pennsylvania claims for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- National Can moved to dismiss, arguing the Title VII claim was untimely, the PHRA displaced the tort claims, and the IIED allegations were legally insufficient.

## Issues

1. Whether the Title VII claim should be dismissed at the pleading stage as time-barred based on alleged untimely administrative filing.
2. Whether the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act provides an exclusive remedy that displaces pendent common-law claims for wrongful discharge and IIED arising from the same events.
3. Whether the alleged supervisory harassment, threats, and retaliation plausibly constitute “extreme and outrageous” conduct and severe distress sufficient to state an IIED claim under Pennsylvania law.

## Decision

- The court denied the motion to dismiss the Title VII claim, holding timeliness could not be resolved against Shaffer on the pleadings.
- The court rejected the argument that the PHRA categorically displaced the pendent tort claims and declined to dismiss them on that basis at this stage.
- The court denied the motion to dismiss the IIED claim, concluding the alleged multi-year harassment coupled with use of supervisory power and implied threats could satisfy Pennsylvania’s “extreme and outrageous” standard if proven.
- The motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, but the central Title VII and IIED theories survived.

## Legal Principles

- On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts well-pleaded allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor; dismissal is improper where the plaintiff could prove facts entitling relief.
- Title VII timeliness defenses often involve fact questions (including when actionable conduct occurred and whether a continuing course of conduct is alleged) and may be unsuitable for resolution on the pleadings alone.
- The PHRA’s statutory remedies do not automatically eliminate all parallel common-law tort claims; tort claims may proceed when they protect interests distinct from, and are not merely duplicative of, statutory discrimination remedies.
- Under Pennsylvania law (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46), IIED requires conduct so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all bounds of decency and distress sufficiently severe; sustained harassment, threats, and abuse of supervisory authority may meet that threshold depending on proof.

## Conclusion

The court permitted Shaffer to proceed past the pleading stage on her Title VII sexual-harassment claim and her IIED claim, and it declined to treat the PHRA as a categorical bar to related tort claims, holding that timeliness and the outrageousness of the alleged conduct required factual development.


Shaffer v. Nat'l Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983)