## Facts

- Shawmut Bank foreclosed on Duane A. Steele’s mortgaged property at 100 Bradford Street in Provincetown, Massachusetts.
- Under a restructuring arrangement, a trust for Steele’s children planned to bid at least $175,000, but the arrangement would end if a third party outbid the trust.
- At the foreclosure sale, Frances Shafir bid $240,000, outbidding the trust by $5,000; she paid a $10,000 deposit and signed a purchase-and-sale agreement with Shawmut.
- After the auction, Steele engaged in conduct directed at Shafir and her real-estate agent, including a menacing in-person encounter, an editorial implying Shafir acted to retaliate and silence the newspaper, and demands to meet without lawyers.
- Steele then had delivered an unsigned draft bankruptcy-court complaint accusing Shafir and her agent of fraud, extortion, and malicious interference; Steele later admitted the allegations lacked any factual basis, and the complaint was never filed.
- Shafir became fearful and distressed and decided not to close on the contract with Shawmut; Shawmut refused to refund the deposit and later sold the property to the children’s trust for $175,000.
- Shafir sued Steele for defamation and intentional interference with contractual relations; a jury found for Shafir on both claims and awarded damages, and the trial court denied Steele’s directed-verdict and JNOV motions.

## Issues

1. Whether Massachusetts recognizes a claim for intentional interference with the plaintiff’s own performance of a contract with a third party as described in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A.
2. Whether the evidence permitted a finding that Steele intentionally and improperly interfered with Shafir’s performance of her contract with Shawmut, causing pecuniary loss.
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defamation verdict and more than nominal damages based on the newspaper editorial.
4. Whether the interference damages were excessive and, if so, whether the issue was preserved for appellate review.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment for Shafir on both intentional interference and defamation.
- The court recognized Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A as a viable Massachusetts cause of action for intentionally and improperly preventing or burdening the plaintiff’s performance of her own contract.
- The evidence supported findings of intentional and improper interference, causation, and pecuniary loss; the denials of the directed-verdict and JNOV motions were upheld.
- The defamation verdict was supported because the editorial was reasonably read to assert defamatory facts about Shafir’s motives and conduct, not merely protected opinion.
- The court declined to disturb the interference damages, noting preservation deficiencies and finding no basis to reverse.

## Legal Principles

- Massachusetts recognizes liability where a defendant intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract between the plaintiff and a third party by preventing performance or making performance more burdensome, resulting in pecuniary loss. (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A.)
- § 766A differs from the inducement model of contract interference; it targets wrongful acts aimed at the plaintiff that hinder the plaintiff’s own contractual performance, even if the third party remains willing to perform.
- “Improper” interference may be shown by intimidation or harassment and by use of knowingly baseless legal accusations as a pressure tactic.
- In defamation, statements framed as commentary may still be actionable where they imply verifiable facts about misconduct or improper motives and are capable of a defamatory meaning.
- Challenges to damages generally require proper preservation through appropriate trial-level objections and post-trial motions.

## Conclusion

Massachusetts affirmed verdicts for defamation and intentional interference and expressly recognized Restatement § 766A, allowing recovery when a defendant’s intentional, improper acts aimed at the plaintiff prevent or substantially hinder the plaintiff’s own performance of a contract with a third party and cause pecuniary loss.


Shafir v. Steele, 431 Mass. 365, 727 N.E.2d 1140 (Mass. 2000)