## Facts

- In 1946, the Kentucky Legislature authorized counties to acquire and maintain land as a “permanent public forest” (now KRS 149.200 et seq.).
- The statute required forest lands to be managed to perpetuate stands of trees, with denuded or bare areas planted to trees, and allowed timber cutting only under approved forestry methods to sustain successive growth.
- The statute also allowed public recreational use only to the extent it did not interfere with using the land “to the best advantage as a public forest,” and stated that revenue derived from forest land “by the sale of timber or otherwise” would accrue to the county.
- Jefferson County acquired about 2,000 acres under the statute, including a 168-acre tract previously used as a clay pit or mine and denuded to some extent.
- After the purchase, the county discovered shale on the 168-acre tract suitable for manufacturing light aggregate used in concrete blocks and other building uses.
- The county fiscal court and county forest commission determined it would serve the public interest to lease the 168 acres for shale mining for 50 years.
- Following advertising, Ohio River Sand Company offered to lease the tract on a royalty basis and to install mining and processing facilities costing roughly $200,000 to $500,000.
- The proposed lease would yield at least $12,000 per year in royalties, which county officials said would be used for maintenance of the broader forest property, given limited tax funds.
- The county attorney filed suit; the case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, and the circuit court held the statute did not allow mining on land acquired and held as a public forest.
- County officials appealed from the judgment barring execution of the mineral lease.

## Issues

1. Whether a county that acquired land under Kentucky’s public-forest statute had authority to grant a long-term mineral lease for commercial shale mining on part of that land.
2. Whether the statute’s statement that county revenue may be derived “by the sale of timber or otherwise” authorizes mineral extraction revenues from public-forest land.
3. Whether the county’s general powers to manage county property can be read to permit a use materially inconsistent with land dedicated by statute to permanent public-forest purposes.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.
- The court held that land acquired and held under the public-forest statute is restricted to forest purposes, with only limited recreational uses and similar minor concessions consistent with that dominant use.
- The phrase “by the sale of timber or otherwise” did not authorize shale mining; “otherwise” had to be read in light of the statute’s object and referred to other forest-related revenue sources.
- The proposed 50-year shale-mining lease was beyond the county’s statutory authority and therefore could not be executed.

## Legal Principles

- When a statute dedicates public land to a defined public use (here, maintenance of a permanent public forest), public officials may not authorize a materially inconsistent use without clear legislative authorization.
- Statutory terms such as “or otherwise” are interpreted in context; general revenue language does not expand authority beyond uses consistent with the statute’s stated purpose.
- General governmental authority to lease, convey, or manage property does not include property held for a special public use under a specific statute, similar to limits on diverting park land to unrelated uses.
- A previously disturbed or denuded portion of land acquired for public-forest purposes remains subject to the statute’s forest-management and replanting requirements.
- Financial need or budget limits do not create implied power to approve an otherwise unauthorized industrial use of dedicated public land.
- Even if a deed conveys fee simple title without express restrictions, statutory conditions attached to acquisition and holding of public-forest land operate as legal restrictions on use.

## Conclusion

Shamburger v. Duncan held that Jefferson County could not lease a denuded portion of its statutorily created public forest for a 50-year shale-mining operation, because the public-forest statute dedicated the land to permanent forest purposes and the “sale of timber or otherwise” revenue clause did not authorize industrial mineral extraction inconsistent with that purpose.


Shamburger v. Duncan, 244 S.W.2d 759 (1951)